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All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III)', 'The Truth in Relativism' and 'Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
13099 Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An analysis of concepts such that we can reach primitive concepts...does not seem to be within human power.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], C513-14), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz
     A reaction: Leibniz is nevertheless fully committed, I think, to the existence of such primitives, and is in the grip of the rationalist dream that thoughts can become completely clear, and completely well-founded.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
5022 We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A proposition is held to be true by us when our mind is ready to follow it and no reason for doubting it can be found.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], p.7)
     A reaction: This follows on from Descartes' view, but it now sounds more like psychology than metaphysics. Clearly a false proposition could fit this desciption. Personally I follow propositions to which I can see no objection, without actually holding them true.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
22040 Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Actual freedom is not something immediately existent in mindedness, but is something to be produced by the mind's own activity. It is thus as the producer of its freedom that we have to consider mindedness in philosophy.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III) [1817], §382, Zusatz), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
     A reaction: Pinkard glosses this as an agent being free by being the centre of a group of social responsibilities. Hence I presume small children have no freedom. Presumably we could deprive citizens of all responsibility, and hence of metaphysical freedom.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
22039 Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Hegel argued that it was the impossibility of a naturalistic account of normativity that distinguished Geist from nature, not Geist's being any kind of metaphysical substance.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III) [1817]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
     A reaction: Hegel always seems to want to have his cake and eat it. Without a mental substance, how can Geist not be part of nature? What is Geist made of? Is his view functionalist? But that is usually naturalistic. Is normativity magic?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22450 If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
     Full Idea: If some societies with divergent moral systems merely confront each other, having no use for the assertion that their own systems are true and the others false except to mark the system to which they adhere, then relativism is a true theory of morality.
     From: report of Bernard Williams (The Truth in Relativism [1974]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Relativism p.3
     A reaction: 'Having no use for' an assertion is not the same as the assertion being impossible. Some liberal cultures refuse to criticise others because their highest value is tolerance, even when the target culture wholly contradicts the critics' other values.