Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Personal Identity and Individuation' and '04: Gospel of St John'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

21757	Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
	Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
	A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos

6294	In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God [John]
	Full Idea: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God.
	From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 01.01)
	A reaction: 'Word' translates the Greek word 'logos', which has come a long way since Heraclitus. The interesting contrast is with the later Platonist view that the essence of God is the Good. So is the source of everything to be found in reason, or in value?

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth

8821	Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
	Full Idea: Jesus: I came into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?
	From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 18:37-8)
	A reaction: There is very little explicit discussion of truth in philosophy before this exchange (apart from Ideas 251 and 586), and there isn't any real debate prior to Russell and the pragmatists. What was Pilate's tone? Did he spit at the end of his question?

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity

7946	The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: The memory criterion for personal identity permits 'branching' (where two things can later meet the criteria of persistence of a single earlier thing), which presents it with serious problems.
	From: report of Bernard Williams (Personal Identity and Individuation [1956]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.4
	A reaction: Of course, any notion of personal identity would have serious problem if people could branch into two, like fissioning amoeba. If that happened, we probably wouldn't have had a strong notion of personal identity in the first place. See Parfit.