13 ideas
| 21757 | Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01 | |
| A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle? |
| 15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong says what is actual (namely a certain roster of universals) might have been impossible. Hence his modal logic is S4, without the 'Brouwersche Axiom'. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by David Lewis - Armstrong on combinatorial possibility 'The demand' | |
| A reaction: So p would imply possibly-not-possibly-p. |
| 7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong takes properties to be universals, and believes there are no 'uninstantiated' universals. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §9.3 | |
| A reaction: At first glance this, like many theories of universals, seems to invite Ockham's Razor. If they are always instantiated, perhaps we should perhaps just try to talk about the instantiations (i.e. tropes), and skip the universal? |
| 9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong says all properties are categorical, but a dispositional predicate may denote such a property; the dispositional predicate denotes the categorical property in virtue of the dispositional role it happens, contingently, to play in this world. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1 | |
| A reaction: I favour the fundamentality of the dispositional rather than the categorical. The world consists of powers, and we find ourselves amidst their categorical expressions. I could be persuaded otherwise, though! |
| 10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong thinks universals play two roles, namely grounding objective resemblances and grounding causal powers. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11 | |
| A reaction: Personally I don't think universals explain anything at all. They just add another layer of confusion to a difficult problem. Oliver objects that this seems a priori, contrary to Armstrong's principle in Idea 10728. |
| 4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: I suggest that we reject the notion that just because the predicate 'red' applies to an open class of particulars, therefore there must be a property, redness. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], p.8), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §6 | |
| A reaction: At last someone sensible (an Australian) rebuts that absurd idea that our ontology is entirely a feature of our language |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong conflates the type-token distinction with that between universals and particulars. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], xiii,16/17) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic 147 n23 | |
| A reaction: This seems quite reasonable, even if you don’t believe in the reality of universals. I'm beginning to think we should just use the term 'general' instead of 'universal'. 'Type' also seems to correspond to 'set', with the 'token' as the 'member'. |
| 10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong says that if it can be proved a priori that a thing falls under a certain universal, then there is no such universal - and hence there is no universal of a thing being identical with itself. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], II p.11) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11 | |
| A reaction: This is a distinctively Armstrongian view, based on his belief that universals must be instantiated, and must be discoverable a posteriori, as part of science. I'm baffled by self-identity, but I don't think this argument does the job. |
| 20180 | A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A happy life must to a great extent be a quiet life, for it is only in an atmosphere of quiet that true joy can live. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
| A reaction: Most people's image of happiness is absorption in an interesting task, or relaxing in good company. The idea that happiness is wild excitement exists, but is a minority view. |
| 20177 | Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is one of the essentials of boredom that one's faculties must not be fully occupied. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
| A reaction: He gives running for your life as an example of non-boredom. I suspect that this is only the sort of boredom that troubled Russell, and not the sort of profound boredom that led the actor George Sanders to suicide (according to his last note). |
| 20179 | Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A certain power of enduring boredom is essential to a happy life, and is one of the things that ought to be taught to the young. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
| A reaction: As an example he suggests that Wordsworth would never have written 'The Prelude' is he had never been bored when young. Which suggests that Russell doesn't really get boredom, seeing it merely as a stimulus to work. |
| 20176 | Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Boredom has been, I believe, one of the great motive powers throughout the historical epoch, and is so at the present day more than ever. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
| A reaction: Most of his essay tells us how to avoid boredom, rather than how it motivates. |
| 20178 | Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We are less bored than our ancestors were, but we are more afraid of boredom | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
| A reaction: I get the impression that the invention of the powerful mobile phone has largely banished boredom from human life, except when you are obliged to switch it off. The fear of boredom may hence be even greater now. |