15 ideas
21757 | Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01 | |
A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle? |
20771 | Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cleanthes says there are six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology. | |
From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.41 | |
A reaction: This was a minority view, as most stoics agreed with Zeno and Chrysippus that there are three main topics. Nowadays there is little discussion of the 'parts' of philosophy, but the recent revival of meta-philosophy should encourage it. |
22438 | Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is in large part concerned with ...what science could get along with, could be reconstructed by means of, as distinct from what science has historically made us of. | |
From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V) | |
A reaction: This nicely summarises the programme for the whole of the philosophy of David Lewis, who was Quine's pupil. If you start by asking what it could 'get by with', it is not surprising that simplicity is the top intellectual virtue for both of them. |
22436 | Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine] |
Full Idea: The logician does not even need to paraphrase the vernacular into his logical notation, for he has learned to think directly in his logical notation, or even (which is the beauty of the thing) to let it think for him. | |
From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V) | |
A reaction: See Williamson's love of logic (and his book on modal metaphysics). This idea embodies the dream of hardcore Frege-Russellian analytic philosophers. I wish someone had told me when I studied logic that the target was to actually think symbolically. |
22431 | Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine] |
Full Idea: The power and simplicity of an algorithm, or indeed of any theory, depend on there being many occurrences of few elements rather than few occurrences of many. | |
From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], III) | |
A reaction: Not sure how this applies to a software function. One which produces a good result from a large number of input variables sounds particularly impressive to me. Many occurrences of a single variable sounds rather inefficient. |
22435 | The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine] |
Full Idea: The logician drops 'if-then' in favour of '→' without ever entertaining the mistaken idea that they are synonymous. | |
From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V) | |
A reaction: [Quine uses the older horseshoe symbol] The conditional in English is not well understood, whereas the symbol is unambiguous. A warning to myself, since I have a tendency to translate symbols into English all the time. [p.156 'implies' is worse!] |
22433 | It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine] |
Full Idea: It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of recognising the timelessness of quantification over temporal entities. | |
From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], IV) | |
A reaction: 'Some moments in this cricket match were crucial'. The domain is not timeless, but consists of moments in this match. Can you say the quantifier is timeless but its domain is not? Only in the sense that 'very' is a timeless word, I think. |
22437 | Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine] |
Full Idea: A logical language is not independent of ordinary language. It has its roots in ordinary language, and these roots are not to be severed. | |
From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V) | |
A reaction: Music to my ears. When you study logic, no one has to teach you what the words 'or' and 'if-then' mean, but they are disambiguated by the symbolism. The roots of logic are in ordinary talk of 'and', 'or' and 'not', which is the real world. |
22434 | Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine] |
Full Idea: Ordinary language is reduced to logical form in two ways: reduction of the variety of idioms and grammatical constructions, and reduction of each surviving idiom to one fixed and convenient interpretation. | |
From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V) | |
A reaction: Is there a conflict between a 'fixed' and a 'convenient' result? By 'fixed' I suppose he means it is a commitment (to not waver). What is the logical form of a sentence which is deliberately ambiguous? |
22432 | Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine] |
Full Idea: Ordinarily the conditional is not thought of as true or false at all, but rather the consequent is thought of as conditionally true or false given the antecedent. | |
From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], III) | |
A reaction: At first this seems obvious, but a conditional asserts a relationship between two propositions, and so presumably it is true if that relationship exists. 'Is it actually true that if it is Monday then everyone in the office is depressed?'. |
6028 | Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius] |
Full Idea: Cleanthes says no incorporeal interacts with a body, but one body interacts with another body; the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body feels shame and fear, and turns red or pale, so the soul is a body. | |
From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Nemesius - De Natura Hominis 78,7 | |
A reaction: This is precisely the interaction problem with dualism, or, as we might now say, the problem of mental causation. The standard Stoic view is that the soul is a sort of rarefied fire, which disperses at death. |
20831 | The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes] |
Full Idea: Nothing incorporeal shares an experience with a body …but the soul suffers with the body when it is ill and when it is cut, and the body suffers with the soul - when the soul is ashamed the body turns red, and pale when the soul is frightened. | |
From: Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]), quoted by Nemesius - De Natura Hominis 2 | |
A reaction: Aha - my favourite example of the corporeal nature of the mind - blushing! It is the conscious content of the thought which brings blood to the cheeks. |
22430 | If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine] |
Full Idea: We understand under what circumstances to say of any given statement that it is true, just as clearly as we understand the statement itself. | |
From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], II) | |
A reaction: This probably shouldn't be taken as a theory of meaning (in which Quine doesn't really believe) but as a plausible statement of correlated facts. Hypothetical assertions might be a problem case. 'If only I could be in two places at once'? |
13713 | Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Quine's view is that time is 'space-like'. Past objects are as real as present ones; they're just temporally distant, just as spatially distant objects are just as real as the ones around here. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953]) by Theodore Sider - Logic for Philosophy 7.3.1 | |
A reaction: Something is a wrong with a view that says that a long-dead person is just as real as one currently living. Death is rather more than travelling to a distant place. Arthur Prior responded to Quine by saying 'tense operators' are inescapable. |
5993 | The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman] |
Full Idea: Cleanthes tried to prove the existence of God, arguing that the ascending scale of living creatures requires there to be a perfect being. | |
From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Cleanthes | |
A reaction: Not a very good argument. Even if you accept its basic claim, it is not clear what has to exist. A perfect tree? If the being transcends the physical (in order to achieve perfection), does it cease to be a 'being'? |