Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Facts and Propositions' and 'De Mundo Praesenti'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

21757	Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
	Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
	A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth

3750	"It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey]
	Full Idea: It is evident that "It is true that Caesar was murdered" means no more than that Caesar was murdered.
	From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927])
	A reaction: At the very least, saying it is true adds emphasis. One sentence is about Caesar, the other about a proposal concerning Caesar, so they can't quite be the same. Note Frege's priority in making this suggestion.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

12714	The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1507-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
	A reaction: The clearest statement of the modification of Aristotle's hylomorphism which Leibniz preferred in his middle period, and which strikes me as an improvement, and about right. Shame that monads got too much of a grip on him, but he was trying to dig deeper.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects

12743	A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In a Being one per se a real union is required consisting not in the situation or motion of parts, as in a chain or a house, but in a unique individual principle and subject of attributes and operations, in us a soul and in a body a substantial form.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1506), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
	A reaction: Leibniz is said not to be an essentialist, by making all properties essential, but he is certainly committed to substance, and it sounds like essence here (or one view of essence), when it makes identity possible. This idea is pure Aristotle.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role

18818	Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey]
	Full Idea: The meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead.
	From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927], p.51), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought
	A reaction: I find this idea quite bizarre. Most sentences have no connection to any action or behavior at all. Do we have to ingeniously contrive some possible action? That is the worst sort of behaviourism. See context - Ramsey wasn't stupid!