Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Letters to Foucher' and 'Minds, Brains and Science'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

21757	Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
	Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
	A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

13095	Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The essence of substances consists in the primitive force of action, or the law of the sequence of changes.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675], 1676)
	A reaction: [a 1676 note on Foucher's reply] It take these to be the two key distinctive Leibnizian contributions to the sort of metaphysic that is needed by modern science. Nature works with intrinsic essences, which are forces determining action.

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room

2427	Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
	Full Idea: Searle originally directed the Chinese Room against machine intentionality rather than consciousness, arguing that it is "understanding" that the room lacks,….but on Searle's view intentionality requires consciousness.
	From: report of John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 4.9.4
	A reaction: I doubt whether 'understanding' is a sufficiently clear and distinct concept to support Searle's claim. Understanding comes in degrees, and we often think and act with minimal understanding.

7389	A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
	Full Idea: There is nothing remotely like genuine understanding in any hunk of programming small enough to imagine readily.
	From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
	A reaction: We mustn't hide behind 'complexity', but I think Dennett is right. It is important to think of speed as well as complexity. Searle gives the impression that he knows exactly what 'understanding' is, but I doubt if anyone else does.

7390	If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
	Full Idea: The argument that begins "this little bit of brain activity doesn't understand Chinese, and neither does this bigger bit..." is headed for the unwanted conclusion that even the activity of the whole brain won't account for understanding Chinese.
	From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
	A reaction: In other words, Searle is guilty of a fallacy of composition (in negative form - parts don't have it, so whole can't have it). Dennett is right. The whole shebang of the full brain will obviously do wonderful (and commonplace) things brain bits can't.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

2117	The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: There is a connection among our appearances that provides us the means to predict future appearances with success, and this connection must have a constant cause.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675])