Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)' and 'Sources of the Self'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


12 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers (e.g Plato) begin with an account of reality, and then appended an account of how we can know it, ..but Descartes turned the tables, insisting that we must first decide what we can know.
     From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.2)
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
     A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
     Full Idea: An analysis is always relative to some objective. It makes no sense to simply demand an analysis of goodness, knowledge, beauty or truth, without some indication of the purpose of the analysis.
     From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.7)
     A reaction: Your dismantling of a car will go better if you know what a car is for, but you can still take it apart in ignorance.
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: The modern notion of the self is defined by disengaged reason (with its associated freedom and dignity), by self-exploration, and by personal commitment.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1)
     A reaction: Taylor makes a good case that this broader view of how the self is seen is as important as narrow debates about personal identity.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: My entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between the sense of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], Pref)
     A reaction: An interesting project. Modern brain research supports the idea that emotions and values are tightly integrated into al thought.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: As a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §2.3)
     A reaction: An important insight. My immediate sense of self makes my personal history central, not an extra. But a history must be a history OF something.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1)
     A reaction: This seems an inevitable convergence of three centuries of thought about personal identity and morality.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1)
     A reaction: Which is why war is required. The growth of civil society meant the inevitable rise of other virtues.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: If you want to discriminate more finely what makes humans worthy of respect, you must call to mind the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about justice, or the awe you feel about human life.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1)
     A reaction: A persuasive part of the claim that such feelings are inseparable from thinking about people in any way at all.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: The issue of consistency presupposes intrinsic description.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1)
     A reaction: This may be the key criticism of Kant. The so-called 'maxim' of an action can be almost infinitely re-expressed to suit the agent.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: In mature utilitarianism , the stress on modern freedom emerges in the rejection of paternalism.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3)
     A reaction: This seems good; it is the beginnings of a rejection of paternalism. What is better, happiness or freedom? What is the value of freedom?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3)
     A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God?