55 ideas
23948 | Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is a matter of living both thoughtfully and passionately, bringing understanding to bear on every passion and forcing every passion into the light of reflection. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.4) | |
A reaction: His main point is that passion is a key part of wisdom, and the idea that wisdom is cold and detached is quite false. Good point. At the very least, wise people must relate sympathetically to others. |
20109 | Hegel inserted society and history between the God-world, man-nature, man-being binary pairs [Hegel, by Safranski] |
Full Idea: Before Hegel, people thought in binary oppositions of God and the world, man and nature, man and being. After Hegel an intervening world of society and history was inserted between these pairs. | |
From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840]) by Rüdiger Safranski - Nietzsche: a philosophical biography 05 | |
A reaction: This is what Popper later called 'World Three'. This might be seen as the start of what we islanders call 'continental' philosophy, which we have largely ignored. Analytic philosophy only discovered this through philosophy of language. |
23942 | Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is conceptual sculpture, the shaping and developing of the intellectual structures within which we live our lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.1) | |
A reaction: Nice. I tend to see philosophy as conceptual analysis (though creating new concepts doesn't quite fit that), but the vision of creating a huge conceptual sculpture sounds good. I would call it a system. (See my book, 'Natural Ideas'!). |
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We may broadly distinguish between two main branches of metaphysics: the 'realist' or 'critical' branch is concerned with what is real (tense, values, numbers); the 'naive' or 'pre-critical' branch concerns natures of things irrespective of reality. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The 'natures' of things are presumably the essences. He cites 3D v 4D objects, and the status of fictional characters, as examples of the second type. Fine says ground is central to realist metaphysics. |
23945 | Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon] |
Full Idea: What is called 'reason' is the passions enlightened, 'illuminated' by reflection and supported by a perspicacious deliberation that the emotions in their urgency normally excluded. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4) | |
A reaction: To suggest that reason more or less is emotions strikes me as missing the point of 'perspicacious', which takes in facts outside our emotional world. We excitedly climb a cliff, then stop when we see the rocks are crumbling. |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is no reason in principle why the ultimate source of what is true should always lie in what exists. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.03) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the weak point of the truthmaker theory, since truths about non-existence are immediately in trouble. Saying reality makes things true is one thing, but picking out a specific bit of it for each truth is not so easy. |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The truth-making relation is usually explicated in modal terms, ...but this lets in far too much. Any necessary truth will be grounded by anything. ...The fact that singleton Socrates exists will be a truth-maker for the proposition that Socrates exists. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.03) | |
A reaction: If truth-makers are what has to 'exist' for something to be true, then maybe nothing must exist for a necessity to be true - in which case it has no truth maker. Or maybe 2 and 4 must 'exist' for 2+2=4? |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Under the possible worlds semantics for logical consequence, each sentence of a language is associated with a truth-set of possible worlds in which it is true, and then something is a consequence if one of these worlds verifies it. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.10) | |
A reaction: [compressed, and translated into English; see Fine for more symbolic version; I'm more at home in English] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that if it is snowing then 2+2=4, but the fact that 2+2=4 does not obtain in virtue of the fact that it is snowing. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.01) | |
A reaction: Critics dislike 'in virtue of' (as vacuous), but I can't see how you can disagree with this obvervation of Fine's. You can hardly eliminate the word 'because' from English, or say p is because of some object. We demand the right to keep asking 'why?'! |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It will not do to say that the physical is causally determinative of the mental, since that leaves open the possibility that the mental has a distinct reality over and above that of the physical. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02) | |
A reaction: The context is a defence of grounding, so that if we say the mind is 'grounded' in the brain, we are saying rather more than merely that it is caused by the brain. A ghost might be 'caused' by a bar of soap. Nice. |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is the notion of 'immediate' ground that provides us with our sense of a ground-theoretic hierarchy. For any truth, we can take its immediate grounds to be at the next lower level. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.05 'Mediate') | |
A reaction: Are the levels in the reality, the structure or the descriptions? I vote for the structure. I'm defending the idea that 'essence' picks out the bottom of a descriptive level. |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We might think of strict ground as moving us down in the explanatory hierarchy. ...Weak ground, on the other hand, may also move us sideways in the explanatory hierarchy. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.05 'Weak') | |
A reaction: This seems to me rather illuminating. For example, is the covering law account of explanation a 'sideways' move in explanation. Are inductive generalities mere 'sideways' accounts. Both fail to dig deeper. |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is the fact to be grounded that 'points' to its ground and not the grounds that point to what they ground. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.11) | |
A reaction: What does the grounding may ground all sorts of other things, but what is grounded only has one 'full' (as opposed to 'partial', in Fine's terminology) ground. He says this leads to a 'top-down' approach to the study of grounds. |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In so far as ground is regarded as a relation it should be between entities of the same type, and the entities should probably be taken as worldly entities, such as facts, rather than as representational entities, such as propositions. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02) | |
A reaction: That's more like it (cf. Idea 17280). The consensus of this discussion seems to point to facts as the best relata, for all the vagueness of facts, and the big question of how fine-grained facts should be (and how dependent they are on descriptions). |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Ground is perhaps best regarded as an operation (signified by an operator on sentences) rather than as a relation (signified by a predicate) | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02) | |
A reaction: Someone in this book (Koslicki?) says this is to avoid metaphysical puzzles over properties. I don't like the idea, because it makes grounding about sentences when it should be about reality. Fine is so twentieth century. Audi rests ground on properties. |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If the grounding relation is not metaphysical (such as normative or natural grounding), there is no need for there to be an explanation of its holding in terms of the essentialist nature of the items involved. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.11) | |
A reaction: He accepts that some things have partial grounds in different areas of reality. |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: For philosophers interested in explanation - of what accounts for what - it is largely through the notion of ontological ground that such questions are to be pursued. Ground, if you like, stands to philosophy as cause stands to science. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02) | |
A reaction: Why does the ground have to be 'ontological'? It isn't the existence of the snow that makes me cold, but the fact that I am lying in it. Better to talk of 'factual' ground (or 'determinative' ground), and then causal grounds are a subset of those? |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is only by embracing the concept of a ground as a metaphysical form of explanation in its own right that one can adequately explain how a reduction of the reality of one thing to another should be understood. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02) | |
A reaction: I love that we are aiming to say 'how' a reduction should be understood, and not just 'that' it exists. I'm not sure about Fine's emphasis on explaining 'realities', when I think we are after more like structural relations or interconnected facts. |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Given any facts, there will be a fusion of those facts. Given the facts that the ball is red and that it is round, there is a fused fact that it is 'red and round'. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.10) | |
A reaction: This is how we make 'units' for counting. Any type of thing which can be counted can be fused, such as the first five prime numbers, forming the 'first' group for some discussion. Any objects can be fused to make a unit - but is it thereby a 'unity'? |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Even the three-dimensionalist might be willing to admit that material things have temporal parts. For given any persisting object, he might suppose that 'in thought' we could mark out its temporal segments or parts. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02) | |
A reaction: A big problem with temporal parts is how thin they are. Hawley says they are as fine-grained as time itself, but what if time has no grain? How thin can you 'think' a temporal part to be? Fine says imagined parts are grounded in things, not vice versa. |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I am inclined to the view that ....each basic modality should be associated with its 'own' explanatory relation. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.01) | |
A reaction: He suggests that 'grounding' connects the various explanatory relations of the different modalities. I like this a lot. Why assert any necessity without some concept of where the necessity arises, and hence where it is grounded? You've got to eat. |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It might be held as a general thesis that every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of certain items. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.11) | |
A reaction: [He cites his own 1994 for this] I'm not sure if I can embrace the 'every' in this. I would only say, more cautiously, that I can only make sense of necessity claims when I see their groundings - and I don't take a priori intuition as decent grounding. |
23957 | We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon] |
Full Idea: We trust certain rational 'intuitions' in ourselves which dispense with reflection but seem to follow an indisputable logic. (note: it is thought ineffable because reflection is the paradigm of rationality. It is no less rational than reflection). | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Solomon uses the example to support that emotion is part of rationality. Since this view of intuition is more or less mine (that intuition can be knowledge, when the justification is obscure), it seems to support his claim. |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I think it should be recognised that there are two fundamentally different types of explanation; one is of identity, or of what something is; and the other is of truth, or of how things are. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.11) |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In addition to scientific or causal explanation, there maybe a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, in which explanans and explanandum are connected, not through some causal mechanism, but through some constitutive form of determination. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm unclear why determination has to be 'constitutive', since I would take determination to be a family of concepts, with constitution being one of them, as when chess pieces determine a chess set. Skip 'metaphysical'; just have Determinative Explanation. |
23943 | Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The distinction between reason and passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' psychology of the human soul. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.2) | |
A reaction: I like faculties, for philosophical purposes, as explanatory tools to account for our metaphysical and conceptual framework, but this point is well made. The danger is that we impose sharp divisions, where reality is more complex. |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is not enough to require that the mental should modally supervene on the physical, since that still leaves open the possibility that the physical is itself ultimately to be understood in terms of the mental. | |
From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02) | |
A reaction: See Horgan on supervenience. Supervenience is a question, not an answer. The first question is whether the supervenience is mutual, and if not, which 'direction' does it go in? |
23952 | I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon] |
Full Idea: I shall be making the claim (sujectively) that the chemistry of the body and the sensations caused by that chemistry have nothing to do with the emotions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Surely an unexpected stabbing pain causes fear? Isn't pain supposed to trigger appropriate emotions? That is not to say that emotions are a feature of body chemistry. |
23954 | Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon] |
Full Idea: An emotion is a basic judgement about our Selves and our place in the world, the projection of the values and ideals, structures and mythologies | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Solomon's main theory. What about the Frege-Geach problem - that I feel emotions (and judgements) about fictions and remote events, in which my personal concerns and involvement are zero? Presumably these emotions are parasitic on his primary type? |
23960 | Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Direction, scope and focus set the stage, but the specific object is what defines the emotion. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.3) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the main distinction between an emotion and a mood. He emphasises that the objects are subjective, rather than factual. |
23961 | The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The heart of every emotion is its value judgements, its appraisals of gain and loss, its indictment of offences and its praise of virtue, its often Manichean judgement of 'good' and 'evil'. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.6) | |
A reaction: He adds blame and excuse. Some of our strongest emotions can just be identifications, rather than judgements, as when we learn of someone else's triumph or disaster. On the whole I agree, though. This is important for Aristotelian virtue theory. |
23965 | Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Emotions can be analysed by direction, scope/focus, object, criteria, status, evaluations, responsibility, intersubjectivity, distance, mythology, desire, power, strategy. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8) | |
A reaction: These are the headings Solomon actually applies in his breakdown of most of the main emotions. See his book for explanations of each of them. If people say philosophy makes no progress, I'd at least point to helpful thinking of this kind. |
23959 | Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon] |
Full Idea: 'Outer-directed' emotions (such as fear) are about particular situations, objects, or other people. …The 'inner-directed' emotions (such as vanity or regret) take one's Self as their focal point. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.1) | |
A reaction: This is Solomon's own distinction. Some of the emotions he cites, such as vanity, seem to me more like long term virtues or vices, rather than emotions. He did say, though, that you can have emotions without feeling, such as long-term hate. |
23936 | It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is our passions, and our passions alone, which provide our lives with meaning. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: This presumably entails that the lives of plants have no meaning. It also seems to be rather egotistical, since it is not clear why anyone else's life should have meaning for me, if I don't directly experience their passions. Interesting, though. |
23963 | Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon] |
Full Idea: An emotion depends on an estimation of our own power. If a lover is jealous they welcome confrontation, but if they are just envious they assume impotence from the start. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.12) | |
A reaction: This seems particularly true of politics, where the possibility (or not) of influencing events makes a huge difference. We can picture a huge variety of emotions when a fight breaks out in public. |
23946 | The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The passions are uniquely subjective, although they sometimes pretend to have a certain objective status. They are not concerned with the world, but with my world. They are not concerned with 'the facts', but with what is important. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.5) | |
A reaction: Values pick out what is 'important'. This idea sums up Solomon's rather solipsistic view of emotions. I accept that emotions are responses, rather than objective judgements, but there is objectivity in their social dimension. Why care about politics? |
23940 | Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Every emotion is a strategy, a purposive attempt to structure our world in such a way as to maximise our sense of personal dignity and self-esteem. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of Solomon's book. There doesn't seem to be much to admire in what he takes to be our chief motivation. I would put a much more social spin on it - that our underlying urge is not self-promotion, but to fit into a community. |
23949 | Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon] |
Full Idea: There are three fundamental species passions - emotions, moods, and desires. …What all passions have in common is their ability to bestow meaning to the circumstances of our lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Moods are said to be 'generalised emotions', where emotions are about something, and desires add objectives. Solomon criticises rigid divisions between mental faculties and states, but it is hard to disagree with this distinction. |
23956 | The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The Myth of the Passions says emotions are irrational forces beyond our control, disruptive and stupid, unthinking and counterproductive, against our 'better interests', and often ridiculous. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The Myth is very unlikely to be correct, for evolutionary reasons. How could there be a selection for a mental feature which distorts truths and leads to dangerous misjudgements? Most emotions motivate us to act successfully. So why do some run wild? |
23953 | Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Feeling is the ornamentation of emotion, not its essence. ...For example, what is the difference in feeling between embarrassment and shame? …We may also experience an emotion like subdued anger or envy with no feeling. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This is very persuasive, and supports the idea that what matters in an emotion is its content, rather than its phenomenology. He adds later that we are often mistaken about our own emotions. |
23964 | There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon] |
Full Idea: There are no 'basic' emotions, only those emotions which are prevalent in a particular society. This reduction to a small set makes it impossible to appreciate the richness of our emotional lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8) | |
A reaction: He cites Descartes as a culprit, and John Watson's famous list of fear, dependency and rage. I think Solomon is probably right. He suggests that the lists are usually individualistic and negative. Individuals may have their private basics! |
23937 | It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is not the passions who require the controls and rationalisations of reason. Rather, it is reason that requires the anchorage and earthy wisdom of the passions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: I like the second half of this. We don't just follow the winds of arguments; we decide into which of the many conflicting winds we should steer the rational arguments, and that needs passions. Only a fool doesn't rationally control their passions. |
23947 | Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon] |
Full Idea: To divide the soul into reason and passion …divides us against ourselves, forcing us each to be defensively half a person, instead of a harmonious whole. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is the best aspect of Solomon's book. I'm not sure, though, how this works in practice. Should I allow the winds of emotion to alter the course of my reasoning, or stunt my feelings by always insisting that reason plays a part? That's too dualist! |
23958 | The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon] |
Full Idea: What is often called the 'irrationality' of our emotions is rather the faulty timing or inept choice of their expressions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The irrationality can be pretty obvious when having a tantrum over trivia, or resenting some tiny slight, or falling in love with a dead film star. That said, his point is well made. |
23944 | Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Emotions are the life force of the soul, the source of most of our values (not all: there is always hunger, thirst, and fatigue). | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to worry that Solomon's account is too individual and subjective. My personal values may derive from my emotions, but I think human and social values are based much more on objective observations and facts. We are social, not solipsists. |
23962 | Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is often said that love takes the interests of the lover as being more important than one's own; but here again we would rather say that love takes the lovers interests as its own. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.9) | |
A reaction: This is because he sees emotions as almost entirely self-centred, and almost never altruistic. To me the evolutionary picture suggest a more social view. Many people want the lives of their ex- to go well, without knowing their new interests. |
23274 | World history has no room for happiness [Hegel] |
Full Idea: World history is not the place for happiness. Periods of happiness are empty pages in history. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: Clearly, Hegel thinks the progress of world history is much more important than happiness. This idea gives backing to those who don't care much about the casualties on either side in a major war. |
23941 | 'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The 'absurdity of life' is nothing than our own unsatisfactory choices, typically of defensiveness and resentment, competition, and 'meaningless' routines. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: He seems to have Camus particularly in mind. He sees love and co-operation as the cure. I sort of agree, but somewhere in all of our minds there lurks an abyss, with the good life looking like a distraction from it. |
23275 | The state of nature is one of untamed brutality [Hegel] |
Full Idea: The 'state of nature' is not an ideal condition, but a condition of injustice, of violence, of untamed natural drives, inhuman acts and emotions. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: He agrees with Hobbes, and disagrees with Rousseau. Hobbes's solution is authoritarian monarchy, but Hegel's solution is the unified and focused state, in which freedom can be realised. |
23276 | The soul of the people is an organisation of its members which produces an essential unity [Hegel] |
Full Idea: The soul [of the people] exists only insofar as it is an organisation of its members, which - by taking itself together in its simple unity - produce the soul. Thus the people is one individuality in its essence. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: Hegel is seen (e.g. by Charles Taylor) as the ancestor of a rather attractive communitarianism, but I think Popper is more accurate in seeing him as the first stage of modern totalitarianism. The people seen as one individual terrifies me. |
23955 | Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Mythologies become ideologies when we play a role in them, live in them, take action and take sides. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This may well be a sceptical American attitude to ideology, since 'mythology' implies a fiction. But I think for most of us there exists the possibility of a good ideology, which correctly points us towards a better life. Dangerous things, though! |
23272 | The human race matters, and individuals have little importance [Hegel] |
Full Idea: Individuals are of slight importance compared to the mass of the human race. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: A perfect statement of the anti-liberal viewpoint. Hegel is complex, but this is the strand that leads to ridiculous totalitarianism, where the highest ideal is to die for the glory of your nation. Importance can only start from individuals. |
23273 | In a good state the goal of the citizens and of the whole state are united [Hegel] |
Full Idea: A state is well constituted and internally strong if the private interest of the citizens is united in the universal goal of the state. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: The obvious question is who decides on the goals, and what to do with the citizens who don't accept them. |
23271 | The goal of the world is Spirit's consciousness and enactment of freedom [Hegel] |
Full Idea: The final goal of the world is Spirit's consciousness of its freedom, and hence also the actualisation of that very freedom. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: I have the impression that this ridiculous idea has been very influential in modern French philosophy, since they all seem to be dreaming of some perfect freedom at the end of the rainbow. Freedom is good, but this gives it a bad name. |
23270 | We should all agree that there is reason in history [Hegel] |
Full Idea: We ought to have the firm and unconquerable belief that there is reason in history. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 2) | |
A reaction: This is a ridiculous but hugely influential idea, and I have no idea what makes Hegel believe it. It is the Stoic idea that nature is intrinsically rational, but extending it to human history is absurd. Human exceptionalism. Needs a dose of Darwin. |