Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Being and Time' and 'Plural Quantification'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


67 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Hegel produced modern optimism; he failed to grasp that consciousness never progresses [Hegel, by Cioran]
     Full Idea: Hegel is chiefly responsible for modern optimism. How could he have failed to see that consciousness changes only its forms and modalities, but never progresses.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by E.M. Cioran - A Short History of Decay 5
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Hegel was the last philosopher of the Book [Hegel, by Derrida]
     Full Idea: Hegel was the last philosopher of the Book.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Jacques Derrida - Positions p.64
     A reaction: Reference to 'the Book' connects this to the great religions which rely on one holy text. The implication is that Hegel was proposing one big solution to all problems. It is doubtful if many philosophers before Hegel dreamt of that either.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Hegel doesn't storm the heavens like the giants, but works his way up by syllogisms [Kierkegaard on Hegel]
     Full Idea: Hegel is a Johannes Climacus who does not storm the heavens, like the giants, by putting mountain upon mountain, but climbs aboard them by way of his syllogisms.
     From: comment on Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Søren Kierkegaard - The Journals of Kierkegaard 2A
     A reaction: [Idea from SY] This appears to be an attempt at insulting Hegel for his timidity, but it seems to be describing the cautious approach which most modern philosophers take to be correct. [PG]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
For Hegel, things are incomplete, and contain external references in their own nature [Hegel, by Russell]
     Full Idea: The basis of Hegel's system is that what is incomplete must not be self-subsistent, and needs the support of other things; whatever has relations to things outside itself must contain some reference to those outside things in its own nature.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy Ch.14
     A reaction: This leads to the idealist doctrine of 'internal relations'. It has some plausibility if you think about the physicist's definition of mass, which has to refer to forces etc. Presumably there is one essence for all of reality, instead of separate ones.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
On the continent it is generally believed that metaphysics died with Hegel [Benardete,JA on Hegel]
     Full Idea: In continental Europe it is widely believed that the metaphysical game was played out in Hegel.
     From: comment on Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Intro
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo]
     Full Idea: Being-in-the-world is a phenomenon of 'care' with a tripartite structure: a) projection towards its possibilities, b) thrownness among those possibilities, so Dasein is not free, and c) fallenness among worldly possibilities, to neglect of its own.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227
     A reaction: Sounds a bit Californian to me. Just living among the world's possibilities is evidently a bad thing, because you could be concentrating on yourself and your own development instead?
Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: 'Phenomenology' can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!' It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings, and to conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated. It is opposed to traditiona' pseudo-problems.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro II.07)
     A reaction: It sounds as if we are invited to look at the world the way a dog might look at it. I am not at all clear what it to be gained from this approach.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Heidegger concludes that 'logos' essentially means 'making something manifest'.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 56/33) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§7
     A reaction: It would at least seem to involve revealing the truth of something, though truth doesn't seem to be central to Heidegger's thought. 'Logos' is often translated as 'an account', as well as a 'reason', so Heidegger may be right.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Making sufficient reason an absolute devalues the principle of non-contradiction [Hegel, by Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: Hegel saw that the absolutization of the principle of sufficient reason (which marked the culmination of the belief in the necessity of what is) required the devaluation of the principle of non-contradiction.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812], 3) by Quentin Meillassoux - After Finitude; the necessity of contingency 3
     A reaction: I pass this on without understanding it, though a joint study of my collection of ideas on sufficient reason and non-contradiction might make it clear. [Let me know if you can explain it!]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Rather than in three stages, Hegel presented his dialectic as 'negation of the negation' [Hegel, by Bowie]
     Full Idea: Hegel's 'dialectic' is often characterised in terms of the triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. This is, however, not the way he presents it. The core of the dialectic is rather what Hegel terms the 'negation of the negation'.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy
     A reaction: Interestingly, this connects it to debates about intuitionist logic, which denies that double-negation necessarily makes a positive. Presumably Marx emphasised the first reading.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The Geach-Kaplan sentence 'Some critics admire only one another' provably has no singular first-order paraphrase using only its predicates.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1)
     A reaction: There seems to be a choice of either going second-order (picking out a property), or going plural (collectively quantifying), or maybe both.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Heidegger is a relentless enemy of ahistorical, absolutist concepts of truth.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 1
     A reaction: I presume that if truth is not absolute then it must be relative, but Polt is a little coy about saying so. For me, anyone who says truth is relative doesn't understand the concept, and is talking about something else.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The defining features of a pure logic are its absolute generality (the objects of discourse are irrelevant), and its formality (logical truths depend on form, not matter), and its cognitive primacy (no extra-logical understanding is needed to grasp it).
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 3)
     A reaction: [compressed] This strikes me as very important. The above description seems to contain no ontological commitment at all, either to the existence of something, or to two things, or to numbers, or to a property. Pure logic seems to be 'if-thenism'.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate]
     Full Idea: For Hegel, the 'negation of negation' is negation that, as it were, doubles back on itself and 'relates itself to itself'.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 6 'Space'
     A reaction: [ref VNP 1823 p.108] Glad we've cleared that one up.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Plural quantification can be used to eliminate the commitment of science and common sense to complex objects. We can use plural quantification over mereological atoms arranged tablewise or chairwise.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.5)
     A reaction: [He cites Hossack and van Ingwagen]
Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Higher-order plural quantification (plural plurals) is often rejected because plural quantification is supposedly ontological innocent, with no plural things to be plural, and because it is not found in ordinary English.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4)
     A reaction: [Summary; he cites Boolos as a notable rejector] Linnebo observes that Icelandic contains a word 'tvennir' which means 'two pairs of'.
Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Plural quantification seems to offer ontological economy. We can pay the price of a mere first-order theory and then use plural quantification to get for free the corresponding monadic second-order theory, which would be an ontological bargain.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.4)
     A reaction: [He mentions Hellman's modal structuralism in mathematics]
Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Second-order quantification and plural quantification are generally regarded as different forms of quantification.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2)
Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The traditional view in analytic philosophy has been that all plural locutions should be paraphrased away by quantifying over sets, though Boolos and other objected that this is unnatural and unnecessary.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5)
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May]
     Full Idea: Continental philosophers, following Heidegger, see in the attempt to reduce the question of being to that of beings a symptom of an age that is too ready to accept the terms in which science conceives the world.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04
     A reaction: Interesting. I take the idea that this is a failing of the modern age to be ridiculous, since I take it to be the key metaphysical move made by Aristotle. Neverthless, Aristotle is closely in tune with modern science. For 'beings', read 'objects'.
For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: We are Dasein - the entity who possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 34/13), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§4
     A reaction: This seems to connect to the emerging 'externalist' view of mind that comes with the external view of content coming from Purnam's Twin Earth idea.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The dialectical opposition of being and nothing is resolved in passing to the concept of becoming [Hegel, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: The concept of being contains within itself it own negation - nothing - and the dialectical opposition between these two concepts is resolved only in the passage to a new concept, becoming, which contains the truth of the passage from nothing to being.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.12
     A reaction: The idea that one concept 'contains' another, or that an opposition could be 'resolved' by a new concept, sounds doubtful to me. For most analytical philosophers, and for Aristotle, oppositions are contradictions, and cannot and should not be 'resolved'.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray]
     Full Idea: Heidegger turns to 'Being' for the same reason that Christians turn to God - to affirm the unique place of humans in the world.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.4
     A reaction: This is the first remark I have encountered that makes sense of Heidegger's Being to me! It places Heidegger as a modernist philosopher, trying to grapple with the decline of religion. I'll stick with Bertrand Russell on that.
Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro I.04)
     A reaction: How do you distinguish the Being of normal humans from the Being of someone in a deep coma, who has no existential issues? Has that Dasein ceased to be? Why does angst create a new mode of Being, but flying doesn't?
Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole is: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6 41)
     A reaction: If you find that thought really illuminating, you are probably on the wrong website. However, the thought that we exist 'ahead of ourselves' might be a fruitful line for existentialists to explore.
In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the others', in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.164), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 5
     A reaction: He seems to be describing the psychology of someone who joins a small crowd which gradually increases in size. I take this relation to others to be the basic existential dilemma, of retaining individual authenticity within a community.
'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: When we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein' we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.297), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology'
     A reaction: Presumably analytic discussions of persons try to be too objective. Heidegger is trying to capture the thought at the heart of Kierkegaard's existentialism. Objectivity and subjectivity are never in conflict. Is there really a different mode of existence?
The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: Heidegger borrows a common German word 'dasein', meaning 'being' or 'existence', to refer both to 'the manner of Being which... man... possesses', and to the creature which possesses it.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.32) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3
     A reaction: This just strikes me as an elementary ontological mistake. Because something has startling properties it doesn't follow that we have a different type of Being. Magnets don't have a different type of being from ordinary iron.
'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: We each of us not only have Dasein (our kind of Being), but we can lay claim to it. Also the Dasein of a thing 'is an issue for it' - we care about the kinds of creatures we can make ourselves into.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.67) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3
     A reaction: Heidegger says other more puzzling things about Dasein. The second half of the idea is what makes Heidegger an existentialist, and an inspiration for Sartre.
Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which, in its very being, comports itself understandingly towards that being. ...Mineness belongs to an existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.78), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1
     A reaction: He might eventually persuade me that Dasein is so different from mere material being that it deserves a category of its own. But a reductive account of mind is also a reductive account of being.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Hegel gives an ontological proof of the existence of everything [Hegel, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: It would not be unfair to say that Hegel's metaphysics consists of an ontological proof of the existence of everything.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.12
     A reaction: This is so gloriously far from David Hume that we must all find some appeal in it. The next question would be whether necessary existence has been proved. If so, given death, decay and entropy, what is it that has to exist? 2nd Law of Thermodynamics?
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Ontology is possible only as phenomenology.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.31), quoted by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.1
     A reaction: Jacquette argues against this claim. The idea seems to be the ultimate extension of Kant, and it is not a big move to say that the only real phenomenology we can discuss is our semantics. Wrong, wrong, wrong.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15)
     A reaction: I assume this is a direct reference to the problem idealists had with the thing-in-itself. It seems that the reality of a thing consists of the strengthened relationship it has with Dasein, which sounds fairly idealist to me.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers speak about a theory's 'ideological commitments' and not just about its 'ontological commitments'.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5.4)
     A reaction: This is a third strategy for possibly evading one's ontological duty, along with fiddling with the words 'exist' or 'object'. An ideological commitment to something to which one is not actually ontologically committed conjures up stupidity and dogma.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Maybe ordinary speakers aren't very concerned about their ontological commitments, and sometimes find it convenient to posit objects.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4)
     A reaction: I think this is the whole truth about the ontological commitment of ordinary language. We bring abstraction under control by pretending it is a world of physical objects. The 'left wing' in politics, 'dark deeds', a 'huge difference'.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
For Hegel, categories shift their form in the course of history [Hegel, by Houlgate]
     Full Idea: For Hegel, the categories of thought are not fixed, eternal forms that remain unchanged throughout history, but are concepts that alter their meaning in history.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
     A reaction: This results from a critique of Kant's rather rigid view of categories. This idea is very influential, and certainly counts among Hegel's better ideas.
Our concepts and categories disclose the world, because we are part of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate]
     Full Idea: For Hegel, the structure of our concepts and categories is identical with, and thus discloses, the structure of the world itself, because we ourselves are born into and so share the character of the world we encounter.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
     A reaction: This is a reasonable speculation, but it makes more sense in the context of natural selection, and an empiricist theory of concepts.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Hegel said Kant's fixed categories actually vary with culture and era [Hegel, by Houlgate]
     Full Idea: Hegel's disagreement with Kant is that categories are not unambiguously universal forms of human understanding, but are conceived in subtly different ways in different cultures and in different historical epochs.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Stephen Houlgate - Hegel p.95
     A reaction: This may be Hegel's most influential idea. Though he hoped that categories would contain truth, by arising untrammelled from reason, and thereby matching reality. His successors seem to have given up on that hope, and settled for relativism.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Heidegger tries to develop a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' ('wesen' as a verb).
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§25-7
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Propositions are not a good clue to the essence of understanding, because we must already understand things before we formulate propositions about them.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.31) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3
     A reaction: I like this, because I think the most important aspects of our thought and understanding are entirely non-verbal - even in cases where they seem to be highly specific and verbal. We don't understand ourselves at all!
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an 'I' or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.1.10)
     A reaction: Descartes had thrown doubt on the informativeness of the phenomena, so presumably your phenomenologist is not interested in whether they reveal any truth. So why are unreliable phenomena of any interest?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become. ...The kind of Being which equipment possesses... we call 'readiness-to-hand' [Zuhandenheit].
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15)
     A reaction: This example would be well at home in the writings of the pragmatists. It is also an important example for existentialists. In analytic philosophy we might say the experience combines perception with direct exerience of causation.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Hegel reputedly claimed to know a priori that there are five planets [Hegel, by Field,H]
     Full Idea: Hegel is reputed to have claimed to have deduced on a priori grounds that the number of planets is exactly five.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Hartry Field - Recent Debates on the A Priori 1
     A reaction: Even if this is a wicked travesty of Hegel, it will do nicely to represent the extremes of claims to a priori synthetic knowledge. Field doesn't offer any evidence. I would love it to be true.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: We always take a noise as the sound of something; we always take a hue as the color of something. We simply do not experience raw, uninterpreted sense-data - these are the inventions of philosophers.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 207/163-4), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3
     A reaction: This is something like the modern view of sense-data as promoted by John McDowell, rather than the experiential atoms of Russell and Moore. Experience is holistic, but that doesn't mean we can't analyse it into components.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Perceptual'
     A reaction: Sounds like our knowledge of electrons. Nice point. Standard analytic discussions of perceiving a glass always treat it in isolation, when it is on an expensive table near a brandy bottle. Or near a hammer.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof [of external things] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. ...The kind of Being of the entity which does the proving has not been made definite enough.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.43a)
     A reaction: The 'scandal' was a remark of Kant's. Presumably Heidegger's exploration of Dasein aims to establish the Being of the prover sufficiently to solve this problem (via phenomenology).
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
     Full Idea: Heidegger argues that having thoughts and feelings is only possible for entity that is actually engaged in the world.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1
     A reaction: This seems to be an a priori exclusion of the possibility of a brain in a vat. I guess the ancestor of this idea is Schopenhauer.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo]
     Full Idea: The world is a world shared with others, so that far from being a solipsistic ego ...Dasein finds itself already amongst others.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.226
     A reaction: Phenomenologists don't seem bothered about the problem of knowing other minds. If you take something for granted, it ceases to be a problem to be solved!
If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: How do I know that other people have minds? The question is a bad one. Precisely because I encounter them at work, play and the like, it is guaranteed that they, too, are Dasein, intelligent agents.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.153-) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3
     A reaction: I've seen film of someone playing peek-a-boo with a bonobo ape, so presumably they have Dasein. It might be easier for the AI community to aim at building a robot with Dasein, than one which was simply conscious.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.2.13)
     A reaction: This is the first plausible fruit of phenomenology I have been able to discover. Analysing the passive mind is not very promising, but seeing what happens when we become more proactive is revealing.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the authentic self - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27)
     A reaction: To a novice this sounds like a requirement for increased self-consciousness during daily activity. 'Be a good animal, true to your animal self' said one of Lawrence's characters.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Everyone is other, and no one is himself.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.165), quoted by Rüdiger Safranski - Nietzsche: a philosophical biography 09
     A reaction: Safranski describes this as the idea of 'structural self-evasion'. He detects the same idea in Nietzsche's 'Daybreak'.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: For Heidegger moods are disclosive; they show us things in a more fundamental way than theoretical propositions ever can. For example, fear reveals something as a threat.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.30) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§30
     A reaction: Most modern students of emotion seem to agree. Even though they may not have specific content, it is always possible to consider the underlying cause of the mood.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The predicate 'is on the table' is 'distributive', since some things are on the table if each one is, whereas the predicate 'form a circle' is 'non-distributive', since it is not analytic that when some things form a circle, each one forms a circle.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1.1)
     A reaction: The first predicate can have singular or plural subjects, but the second requires a plural subject? Hm. 'The rope forms a circle'. The second is example is not true, as well as not analytic.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: We do not throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something is encountered as such, the thing in question has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.190-1), quoted by George Dickie - The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 3 'Undoing'
     A reaction: Analytic philosophy and science have tried to dismantle experience, and Heidegger wants to put it back together. I would say there is a big difference between encountering a thing (which is a bit facty), and understanding it (which is more valuey).
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Because Dasein is lost in the 'they', it must first find itself. It must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], II.2.54)
     A reaction: I wish there was some criterion for knowing when you are being yourself and when you are not.
Humans have no fixed identity, but produce and reveal their shifting identity in history [Hegel, by Houlgate]
     Full Idea: For Hegel, the absolute truth of humanity is that human beings have no fixed, given identity, but rather determine and produce their own identity and their world in history, and that they gradually come to the recognition of this fact in history.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
     A reaction: This quintessentially existentialist idea, most obvious in Sartre, seems to have originated with this view of Hegel's.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualised in individualisation.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.40)
     A reaction: Is sounds like insecurity, as a sort of trauma that shocks one into self-realisation. The idea means very little to me personally.
Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
     Full Idea: For Heidegger, as a consequence of my anxiety in the face of death, I am set free to live my life as my own rather than doing things merely because others expect me to do them.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 7
     A reaction: Contrary to Epicurus, Heidegger thinks anxiety about death is a good thing. The point is, I suppose, that we all die alone, and people who are very socially contrained need to face up to death in order to grasp their autonomy.
Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo]
     Full Idea: Anxiety [angst] is the disturbing sense of uncanniness by which Dasein is overtaken (thrownness) when it discovers there is nothing other than its own freedom to sustain its projects (projection), and from which Dasein constantly takes flight (falling).
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227
     A reaction: This seems to be Kierkegaard's idea, unamended. In my experience anxiety only comes when I am forced into making decisions by worldly situations. An 'existential crisis' is a sort of blankness appearing where a future life was supposed to be.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Dasein's Being-what-it-is (essentia) must….be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia).
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 67/42), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§2
     A reaction: This seems to be the origin of Sartre's famous slogan 'existence before essence'. It seems to be a rebellion against Husserl's quest for essences.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: Heidegger says you must choose your hero; either you choose 'das Man', the inauthentic life, or you choose yourself - the point being that you have to choose yourself as your hero in order to be authentic.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Simon Critchley - Impossible Objects: interviews 5
     A reaction: If Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' is the model for choosing yourself as hero, I am not too sure about this idea. Needing a hero seems awfully German and romantic. Ein Heldenleben. Be your own anit-hero (like a standup comedian)?
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Hegel's Absolute Spirit is the union of human rational activity at a moment, and whatever that sustains [Hegel, by Eldridge]
     Full Idea: We may take Hegel's Absolute Spirit to be the union of collective, human rational activity at a historical moment with its proper object, the forms of social and individual life that the rational activity is devoted to understanding and sustaining.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Richard Eldridge - G.W.F. Hegel (aesthetics) 1
     A reaction: From this formulation it sounds as if the whole human race might have momentary union, but presumably it is more local 'peoples' that can exhibit this.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Society isn’t founded on a contract, since contracts presuppose a society [Hegel, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: For Hegel, society cannot be founded on a contract, since contracts have no reality until society is in place.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Roger Scruton - Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey 28.2
     A reaction: Interesting, and reminiscent of the private language argument, but contracts surely start as deals between individuals (on a desert island?).
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
When man wills the natural, it is no longer natural [Hegel]
     Full Idea: When man wills the natural, it is no longer natural.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]), quoted by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.4
     A reaction: Sounds good, though I'm not sure what it means. The application of the word 'natural' seems a bit arbitrary to me. No objective joint exists between the natural and unnatural. The default position has to be that everything is natural.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Hegel's entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof [Schopenhauer on Hegel]
     Full Idea: Hegel's entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof.
     From: comment on Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Arthur Schopenhauer - Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' Ch.II
     A reaction: All massive a priori metaphysics is summed up in this argument, which is right at the core of philosophy.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Hegel said he was offering an encyclopaedic rationalisation of Christianity [Hegel, by Graham]
     Full Idea: Hegel claimed that his philosophy was nothing less than an encyclopaedic rationalisation of the Christian religion.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.5
     A reaction: Why did he pick Christianity to rationalise? How can you reason properly if you start with a dogma?