Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III)', 'Sentences' and 'Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

18528	The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol]
	Full Idea: It appears that a single thing, which must be imagined as some sort of interval [intervallum] existing between two things, cannot exist in extramental reality, but only in the intellect.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], I fols318 v a-b), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7
	A reaction: This is the standard medieval denial of the existence of real relations. It contrasts with post-Russell ontology, which seems to admit relations as entities. Heil and Auriol and right.

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals

10197	An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: An immanent universal will routinely be 'at some distance from itself', in the sense that it is wholly present in more than one place.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
	A reaction: This is the Aristotelian view, which sounds distinctly implausible in this formulation. Though I suppose redness is wholly present in a tomato, in the way that fourness is wholly present in the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. How many rednesses are there?

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

10198	If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
	A reaction: The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?

10199	Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
	Full Idea: Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
	From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
	A reaction: [compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will

22040	Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel]
	Full Idea: Actual freedom is not something immediately existent in mindedness, but is something to be produced by the mind's own activity. It is thus as the producer of its freedom that we have to consider mindedness in philosophy.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III) [1817], §382, Zusatz), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
	A reaction: Pinkard glosses this as an agent being free by being the centre of a group of social responsibilities. Hence I presume small children have no freedom. Presumably we could deprive citizens of all responsibility, and hence of metaphysical freedom.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism

22039	Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard]
	Full Idea: Hegel argued that it was the impossibility of a naturalistic account of normativity that distinguished Geist from nature, not Geist's being any kind of metaphysical substance.
	From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III) [1817]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
	A reaction: Hegel always seems to want to have his cake and eat it. Without a mental substance, how can Geist not be part of nature? What is Geist made of? Is his view functionalist? But that is usually naturalistic. Is normativity magic?

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter

16589	Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol]
	Full Idea: Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
	A reaction: Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal.

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions

16651	God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol]
	Full Idea: If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4
	A reaction: How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples.