Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Events' and 'Aristotelian commentaries'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

21757	Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
	Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
	A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes

8979	Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons]
	Full Idea: Some changes are slow and continuous and are called 'processes' rather than events; the growth of a tree or the greying of John's hair.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 3.2)
	A reaction: So making a loaf of bread is an event rather than a process, and World War I was a process rather than an event? If you slow down a dramatic event (on film), you see that it is really a process. I take 'process' to be a much more illuminating word.

8981	Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons]
	Full Idea: There is arguably a parallel between the mass-count distinction among meanings of nouns and the process-event distinction among meanings of verbs. Processes, like stuff, do not connote criteria for counting, whereas events, like things, do.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 6.2)
	A reaction: Hm. You can have several processes, and a process can come to an end - but then you can have several ingredients of a cake, and you can run out of one of them. This may be quite a helpful distinction.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events

8973	Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
	Full Idea: The ontology of events rose in philosophy with the rise of relativity theory in physics. Einstein postulated the relativity of simultaneity to an observer's state of motion. The terms of the relation of simultaneity must be events or their parts.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 1.1.2)
	A reaction: Intriguing. Philosophers no doubt think they are way ahead of physicists in such a metaphysical area. Personally I regard the parentage of the concept as good grounds for scepticism about it. See Idea 7621 for my reason.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification

16751	Unity by aggregation, order, inherence, composition, and simplicity [Conimbricense, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: The Coimbrans have five degrees of unity: by aggregation (stones), by order (an army), per accidens (inherence), per se composite unity (connected), and per se unity of simple things.
	From: report of Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], Phys I.9.11.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3
	A reaction: [my summary of Pasnau's summary] Take some stones, then order them, then glue them together, then melt them together. The unity of inherence is a different type of unity from these stages. This is a hylomorphic view.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

16720	Secondary qualities come from temperaments and proportions of primary qualities [Conimbricense]
	Full Idea: Colors, flavours, smells, and other secondary qualities arise from the various temperaments and proportions of the primary qualities.
	From: Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], I.10.4 Gen&C), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
	A reaction: This is a bit more subtle than merely mixing the primary qualities. What about the powers of the primary qualities? Presumably that is the 'temperaments'?