21757
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Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
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Full Idea:
Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
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From:
Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
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A reaction:
This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?
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10751
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Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg]
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Full Idea:
Second-order logic raises doubts because of its ontological commitment to the set-theoretic hierarchy, and the allegedly problematic epistemic status of the second-order consequence relation.
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From:
Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §1)
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A reaction:
The 'epistemic' problem is whether you can know the truths, given that the logic is incomplete, and so they cannot all be proved. Rossberg defends second-order logic against the second problem. A third problem is that it may be mathematics.
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10753
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Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg]
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Full Idea:
Logical consequence is intuitively taken to be a semantic notion, ...and it is therefore the formal semantics, i.e. the model theory, that captures logical consequence.
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From:
Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2)
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A reaction:
If you come at the issue from normal speech, this seems right, but if you start thinking about the necessity of logical consequence, that formal rules and proof-theory seem to be the foundation.
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10752
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Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg]
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Full Idea:
Deductive consequence, written Γ|-S, is loosely read as 'the sentence S can be deduced from the sentences Γ', and semantic consequence Γ|=S says 'all models that make Γ true make S true as well'.
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From:
Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2)
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A reaction:
We might read |= as 'true in the same model as'. What is the relation, though, between the LHS and the RHS? They seem to be mutually related to some model, but not directly to one another.
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10756
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A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg]
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Full Idea:
A standard model is a set of objects called the 'domain', and an interpretation function, assigning objects in the domain to names, subsets to predicate letters, subsets of the Cartesian product of the domain with itself to binary relation symbols etc.
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From:
Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
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A reaction:
The model actually specifies which objects have which predicates, and which objects are in which relations. Tarski's account of truth in terms of 'satisfaction' seems to be just a description of those pre-decided facts.
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10758
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If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg]
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Full Idea:
A mathematical theory is 'categorical' if, and only if, all of its models are isomorphic. Such a theory then essentially has just one model, the standard one.
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From:
Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
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A reaction:
So the term 'categorical' is gradually replacing the much-used phrase 'up to isomorphism'.
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8981
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Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons]
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Full Idea:
There is arguably a parallel between the mass-count distinction among meanings of nouns and the process-event distinction among meanings of verbs. Processes, like stuff, do not connote criteria for counting, whereas events, like things, do.
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From:
Peter Simons (Events [2003], 6.2)
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A reaction:
Hm. You can have several processes, and a process can come to an end - but then you can have several ingredients of a cake, and you can run out of one of them. This may be quite a helpful distinction.
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