Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III)', 'Reasons for Actions and Desires' and 'Paradoxes: Form and Predication'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
14235 Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile]
     Full Idea: If the rule is asserted 'Given any well-determined objects, they can be collected into a set by an application of the 'set of' operation', then on the usual account of 'they' this is a tautology. Collection comes automatically with this form of reference.
     From: James Cargile (Paradoxes: Form and Predication [1979], p.115), quoted by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? Intro
     A reaction: Is this a problem? Given they are well-determined (presumably implying countable) there just is a set of them. That's what set theory is, I thought. Of course, the iterative view talks of 'constructing' the sets, but the construction looks unstoppable.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
22040 Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Actual freedom is not something immediately existent in mindedness, but is something to be produced by the mind's own activity. It is thus as the producer of its freedom that we have to consider mindedness in philosophy.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III) [1817], §382, Zusatz), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
     A reaction: Pinkard glosses this as an agent being free by being the centre of a group of social responsibilities. Hence I presume small children have no freedom. Presumably we could deprive citizens of all responsibility, and hence of metaphysical freedom.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
22039 Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Hegel argued that it was the impossibility of a naturalistic account of normativity that distinguished Geist from nature, not Geist's being any kind of metaphysical substance.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III) [1817]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
     A reaction: Hegel always seems to want to have his cake and eat it. Without a mental substance, how can Geist not be part of nature? What is Geist made of? Is his view functionalist? But that is usually naturalistic. Is normativity magic?
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
22393 I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot]
     Full Idea: I am sure I do not understand the idea of a reason for acting, and I wonder whether anyone else does either. I incline to the view that all such reasons depend either on the agent's interests (meaning here what is in his interest) or else on his desires.
     From: Philippa Foot (Reasons for Actions and Desires [1972], p.156 Post)
     A reaction: It seems common to assume that a reason for an action must be something rational, but it makes sense to say that the reason for someone's action was an irrational whim. Is the reason for an action just the cause of the action?