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21757
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Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
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Full Idea:
Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
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From:
Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
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A reaction:
This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?
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6844
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Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
Scientism is the belief that all phenomena can be explained through the methodology of the natural sciences, and the belief that, therefore, all phenomena are capable of a causal explanation.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.196)
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A reaction:
He links two ideas together, but I tend to subscribe fully to the second idea, but less fully to the first. Scientific method, if there is such a thing (Idea 6804), may not be the best way to lay bare the causal network of reality.
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6835
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German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
In his Third Critique Kant established a series of dualisms (pure/practical reason, nature/freedom, epistemology/ethics) but failed to provide a unifying principle; German idealism can be seen as an attempt to provide this principle.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.187)
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A reaction:
He cites 'subject', 'spirit', 'art', 'will to power', 'praxis' and 'being' as candidates. This is a helpful overview for someone struggling to get to grips with that tradition.
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6837
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Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
In continental philosophy from Hegel onwards, systematic philosophical questions have to be linked to socio-historical enquiry, and the distinctions between philosophy, history and society begin to fall apart.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
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A reaction:
I have a strong sales resistance to this view of philosophy, just as I would if it was said about mathematics. It seems to imply a bogus view that history exhibits direction and purpose (the 'Whig' view). There are pure reasons among the prejudices.
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6845
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Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
In continental philosophy there is a pernicious tendency to explain everything in terms of 'one big thing', such as the 'death drive' (Freud), 'being' (Heidegger), 'the real' (Lacan), 'power' (Foucault), 'the other' (Levinas), or 'différance' (Derrida).
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.197)
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A reaction:
From a fan of this type of philosophy, this is a refreshing remark, because if pinpoints a very off-putting feature. Each of these 'big things' should be up for question, not offered as axiomatic assumptions that explain everything else.
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6843
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Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
If nihilism is the threat of the collapse of meaning, then my position is that one has to accept meaninglessness as an achievement, as an accomplishment that permits a transformed relation to everyday life.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.193)
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A reaction:
This sounds cheerfully upbeat and life-enhancing, but I don't quite see how it works. One could easily end up laughing at the most appalling tragedies, and that seems to me to be an inappropriate (Aristotelian word) way to respond to tragedy.
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8412
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A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
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A reaction:
There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
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8413
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Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
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A reaction:
This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
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8411
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Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.
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