Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Thought: a very short introduction' and 'Against 'Ostrich Nominalism''

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
     A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers (like Devitt) think of reality as made up of things. Others, like me, think of it as made up of facts or states of affairs.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
     A reaction: Devitt is a follower of Quine on this. Personally I rather like 'processes'. Unanalysed things with predication (Quine) don't look promising. I currently favour things with active powers, which give rise to properties. See Shoemaker and Ellis.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
     A reaction: Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here!
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: A philosophical account of a general sort is required of what it is for different tokens to be of the same type. To refuse to give such an account is to be a metaphysical ostrich.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §1)
     A reaction: This defines Ostrich Nominalism (a label Armstrong aims at Quine). I certainly sympathise with Armstrong. If there is no more to a class (a type) than just having members (tokens), nothing is explain. What is natural, essential, intensional etc.?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne]
     Full Idea: A claim that might be very plausible given one set of background beliefs might be highly implausible when evaluated in the light of a different set of background beliefs.
     From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.7)
Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne]
     Full Idea: Endorsing Clifford's dictum threatens to undermine our right to hold many of our most cherished beliefs about morality, politics, and philosophy, for these are domains in which it is notoriously difficult to secure consensus.
     From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.7)
     A reaction: I would say that those beliefs are amenable to evidence, but the evidence is often highly generalised, which is what makes those subjects notoriously difficult. The existence of a convention is a sort of evidence.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne]
     Full Idea: The motivations for physicalism about the mind are that it accounts for correlations between states of the brain and states of thought, ...that it accounts for the causal role of thoughts, ...and that it does justice to the continuity of nature.
     From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.2)
     A reaction: [summary] That is a pretty good summary of why I am a physicalist about the mind. I take all other theories to be dead footnotes in the history of thought - unless someone can produce a really good new argument. Which they can't.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne]
     Full Idea: One striking feature of human thought involves our ability to disengage the focus of thought from that of our perceptual attention. ...To get a fix on what an animal is thinking about, one need only determine the object of its perceptual attention.
     From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.4)
     A reaction: What happens when an animal closes its eyes, or stirs violently during sleep? I take the hallmark of human thought to be its multi-level character, and this offers nice evidence for that view. Doing philosophy while driving a car is very revealing.
Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne]
     Full Idea: Egocentric conceptions of space employ a frame of reference that is focused on oneself; ...geocentric conceptions of space, by contrast, employ a frame of reference that is centred on the earth.
     From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.5)
     A reaction: Famously, Europeans nearly always employ the egocentric conception, but many other cultures are geocentric. Thus the salt cellar is either 'to my left' or 'to the west'. In the latter view, everyone always knows their orientation (even indoors?).
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne]
     Full Idea: One could think that the structure of thought has more in common with that of maps or diagrams, and is not particularly language-like.
     From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.2)
     A reaction: It seems unwise to be ensnared by analogies on this one, since the phenomenon is buried deep. You can no more infer what goes on underneath than you can infer electrons from looking at trees?