Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Propositions', 'Letters to Thomas Burnett' and 'On Divination ('De divinatione')'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9455 Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
     Full Idea: Some say that proper names have no descriptive content, but others think that although a name does not have the right sort of descriptive content which fixes a unique referent, it has a content which fixes the sort or category to which it belongs.
     From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §7)
     A reaction: Presumably 'Mary', and 'Felix', and 'Rover', and 'Smallville' are cases in point. There is a well known journalist called 'Manchester', a famous man called 'Hilary', a village in Hertfordshire called 'Matching Tie'... Interesting, though.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
9454 The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
     Full Idea: The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's, ...of which to many Frege's is the most intuitive of the four. Frege says they refer to the unique item (if it exists) which satisfies the predicate.
     From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §5)
     A reaction: He doesn't expound the other three, but I record this a corrective to the view that Russell has the only game in town.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13197 The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I consider the notion of substance to be one of the keys to the true philosophy. ....I imagine that philosophers will one day know the notion of substance a bit better than they do now.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomas Burnett [1703], 1699.01.20/30)
     A reaction: This is a controversial remark at this historical moment, when the apparent Aristotelian commitment to substances was becoming discredited. Personally I would eliminate substance, but not just because physicists don't refer to it.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
6029 Whoever knows future causes knows everything that will be [Cicero]
     Full Idea: Whoever grasps the causes of future things must necessarily grasp all that will be.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Divination ('De divinatione') [c.46 BCE], 1.127)
     A reaction: Laplace stated this idea in terms of Newtonian physics (Idea 3441), but the key idea is stated more simply and clearly here. God can know the future in this way, without actually seeing it happen now. I can't think why it should not be true.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
9453 Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
     Full Idea: The propositions behind 'Cicero is emulated more than Tully' seems to differ somehow from 'Tully is emulated more than Cicero', despite the proper names being rigid designators.
     From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
     A reaction: Interesting, because this isn't a directly propositional attitude situation like 'believes', though it depends on such things. Bealer says this is a key modern difficulty with propositions.
9452 Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
     Full Idea: The reductionist view of propositions sees them as either extensional functions from possible worlds to truth values, or as ordered sets of properties, relations, and perhaps particulars.
     From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
     A reaction: The usual problem of all functional accounts is 'what is it about x that enables it to have that function?' And if they are sets, where does the ordering come in? A proposition isn't just a list of items in some particular order. Both wrong.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
9451 Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]
     Full Idea: Philosophers have been skeptical about abstract objects, and so have been skeptical about propositions,..but with the rise of modal logic and metaphysics, and cognitive science's realism about intentional states, traditional propositions are now dominant.
     From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
     A reaction: I personally strongly favour belief in propositions as brain states, which don't need a bizarre ontological status, but are essential to explain language, reasoning and communication.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
13198 Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained. [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I believe that both gravity and elasticity are in matter only because of the structure of the system and can be explained mechanically or through impulsion.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomas Burnett [1703], 1699 draft)
     A reaction: The significance of this remark is that gravity is held (in full knowledge of Newton's work) to be within matter, and not imposed from the outside. I believe we now postulate a particle as part of the explanation.