18 ideas
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
Full Idea: We should abandon the idea that the use of plural forms commits us to the existence of sets/classes… Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. There are not two sorts of things in the world, individuals and collections. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]), quoted by Henry Laycock - Object | |
A reaction: The problem of quantifying over sets is notoriously difficult. Try http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/index.html. |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Is there, in addition to the 200 Cheerios in a bowl, also a set of them all? And what about the vast number of subsets of Cheerios? It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios you are eating a set. What you are doing is: eating the Cheerios. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.72) | |
A reaction: In my case Boolos is preaching to the converted. I am particularly bewildered by someone (i.e. Quine) who believes that innumerable sets exist while 'having a taste for desert landscapes' in their ontology. |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Boolos has proposed an alternative understanding of monadic, second-order logic, in terms of plural quantifiers, which many philosophers have found attractive. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 3.5 |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
Full Idea: In an indisputable technical result, Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can be used to interpret monadic second-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], Intro) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification Exposed Intro |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Boolos discovered that any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], §1) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification Exposed p.74 |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Indispensable to cross-reference, lacking distinctive content, and pervading thought and discourse, 'identity' is without question a logical concept. Adding it to predicate calculus significantly increases the number and variety of inferences possible. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.54) | |
A reaction: It is not at all clear to me that identity is a logical concept. Is 'existence' a logical concept? It seems to fit all of Boolos's criteria? I say that all he really means is that it is basic to thought, but I'm not sure it drives the reasoning process. |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Boolos proposes that second-order quantifiers be regarded as 'plural quantifiers' are in ordinary language, and has developed a semantics along those lines. In this way they introduce no new ontology. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 7 n32 | |
A reaction: This presumably has to treat simple predicates and relations as simply groups of objects, rather than having platonic existence, or something. |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Standard second-order existential quantifiers pick out a class or a property, but Boolos suggests that they be understood as a plural quantifier, like 'there are objects' or 'there are people'. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.4 | |
A reaction: This idea has potential application to mathematics, and Lewis (1991, 1993) 'invokes it to develop an eliminative structuralism' (Shapiro). |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Abandon the idea that use of plural forms must always be understood to commit one to the existence of sets of those things to which the corresponding singular forms apply. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.66) | |
A reaction: It seems to be an open question whether plural quantification is first- or second-order, but it looks as if it is a rewriting of the first-order. |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Boolos virtually patented the new device of plural quantification. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by José A. Benardete - Logic and Ontology | |
A reaction: This would be 'there are some things such that...' |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Ontological commitment is carried by first-order quantifiers; a second-order quantifier needn't be taken to be a first-order quantifier in disguise, having special items, collections, as its range. They are two ways of referring to the same things. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.72) | |
A reaction: If second-order quantifiers are just a way of referring, then we can see first-order quantifiers that way too, so we could deny 'objects'. |
3016 | Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Even the gods cannot strive against necessity. | |
From: report of Pittacus (reports [c.610 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 01.5.4 |
23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
Full Idea: Motives will cause persons for form intentions; it is intentions which more directly guide actions. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
A reaction: This is invites the question of whether there is a sharp distinction between the motive and the action. Detectives look for motives, but law courts look for intentions. |
23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
Full Idea: I deny the claim that good intentions are necessary for virtue. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
A reaction: Presumably one could continually do the right thing, because it was your duty or your job, without actually being well motivated for it. |
23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
Full Idea: The behavioural aspects of virtue are more important than its phenomenology, because virtue is best defined along consequentialist lines. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the thesis of her paper. Quite persuasive. Consequences are, of course, important in all moral theories (even Kant's). She doesn't rely on human nature. The social virtues vary according to the circumstances, such as gossiping in wartime. |
23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
Full Idea: A moral virtue is a character trait (a disposition or cluster of dispositions) which, generally speaking, produces good consequences for others. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
A reaction: There are self-directed virtues, such as keeping fit and healthy. There are virtues for ways to receive the kindness of others. That said, I like this idea. |
23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
Full Idea: Women now have more control over becoming pregnant. Men can now be more certain of paternity, without the constraint of female chastity. Hence chastity is no longer considered a moral virtue. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |
A reaction: A persuasive argument that virtues are defined by their consequences (to which I add my example of gossiping in wartime). Different social situations and crises promote or relegate the status of certain virtues (such as food hoarding). |
23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |
Full Idea: If generosity towards the needy in the long run produced [social] parasites, and if generosity did this systematically, then it would not be a moral virtue. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |
A reaction: A very persuasive example. Hume has similar views - that we encourage those emotions which have good social outcomes. |