7 ideas
5300 | Philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change it [Marx] |
Full Idea: The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it. | |
From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §XI) | |
A reaction: The 'point' of what? Personally I am more with Aristotle - that the aim is to create a society in which we can all aspire to contemplate like gods. As an interim statement of aim, though, one must respect Marx. But was he a philosopher? |
5297 | Whether human thinking can be 'true' must be decided in practice, not theory [Marx] |
Full Idea: The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question; man must prove the truth of his thinking in practice. | |
From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §II) | |
A reaction: This would appear to be an assertion of the pragmatic view of truth well before Peirce. The obvious objections arise, such as whether falsehood (Plato's 'noble lie') might not have equal practical success, and whether truth might be disastrous. |
16030 | 'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E] |
Full Idea: In the Aristotelian tradition, a 'nominal' definition is a pseudo-definition that identifies the members of the species or genus, but fails to capture the essence, e.g. 'man is the featherless biped'. | |
From: Jan-Erik Jones (Real Essence [2012], §2) | |
A reaction: You can 'individuate' an object as 'the only object in that drawer', while revealing nothing about it. So what must a definition do, in addition to picking something out uniquely? |
9992 | The 'extension of a concept' in general may be quantitatively completely indeterminate [Cantor] |
Full Idea: The author entirely overlooks the fact that the 'extension of a concept' in general may be quantitatively completely indeterminate. Only in certain cases is the 'extension of a concept' quantitatively determinate. | |
From: George Cantor (Review of Frege's 'Grundlagen' [1885], 1932:440), quoted by William W. Tait - Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind | |
A reaction: Cantor presumably has in mind various infinite sets. Tait is drawing our attention to the fact that this objection long precedes Russell's paradox, which made the objection more formal (a language Frege could understand!). |
22598 | The authentic self exists at the level of class, rather than the individual [Marx, by Dunt] |
Full Idea: Instead of focusing on the individual, Marxism suggested that the authentic self was at the social level in the form of class. | |
From: report of Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846]) by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 6 | |
A reaction: [not sure of the best source in Marx] This idea is expressed here by a defender of liberal individualism. Dunt persuasively attacks any concept of the self as part of some group, rather than as being an individual. |
5298 | The human essence is not found in individuals but in social relations [Marx] |
Full Idea: The human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual; in its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. | |
From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §VI) | |
A reaction: This is a key Marxist doctrine, and the central difference from Aristotle. Personally I am more with Aristotle, but the truth obviously lies somewhere in between. Man must be a 'social being', or there wouldn't be any social relations. |
5299 | Religious feeling is social in origin [Marx] |
Full Idea: The "religious sentiment" (discussed by Feuerbach) is itself a social product. | |
From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §VII) | |
A reaction: Recent brain research has identified a part of the brain which is only active during religious thought and experience. It is easy to produce cynical political accounts of religion, but in its time it was also quite a good scientific account of nature. |