13 ideas
4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
Full Idea: It has been proposed (on the basis of observations) that young children have three innate principles of counting - one-to-one correspondence of number to item, stable order for numbers, and cardinality (which labels the nth item counted). | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.60) | |
A reaction: I like the idea of observed patterns as central (which is the one-to-one principle). But the other two principles are plausible, and show why pure empiricism won't work. |
4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Rats can determine the number of times they have pressed a lever up to at least twenty-four presses,…and can consistently turn down the fifth tunnel on the left in a maze. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.58) | |
A reaction: This seems to encourage an empirical view of maths (pattern recognition?) rather than a Platonic one. Or numbers are innate in rat brains? |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: In his 'Analysis of Matter' (1927), Russell sought to analyse the chief concepts of physics, such as force and matter, in terms of events. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction is that this is not very promising, simply because we can always ask why a particular event occurred, and this seems to point to a deeper level in the analysis. See Idea 4779, for example. |
4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Infant behaviour implies inbuilt ontological categories of thing, place, event, path, action, sound, manner, amount and number. ...There is an algebra of relationships between them. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.109) | |
A reaction: Interesting. We would expect the categories in infant brains to have instrumental value, but we don't have to accept them as true. Adults (even Aristotle) are big infants. |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
Full Idea: The physical object, as inferred from perception, is a group of events arranged about a centre. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927], 23) | |
A reaction: At least I like the active aspect of this definition. You then have to explain what an event is, without mentioning objects. You'd better no mention properties either, since they will probably depend on the dreaded objects. |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
Full Idea: There may be a substance at the centre of an object, but is no reason to think so, since the group of events making up the object will produce exactly the same percepts; so the substance, if there is one, is an abstract possibility irrelevant to science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927], 23) | |
A reaction: All empiricists (as Russell is in this passage) seem to neglect inference to the best explanation. Things can be indirectly testable, and I would say that there are genuine general entities which are too close to abstraction to ever be testable. |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Russell reverted to realism when he recognised that the notion of causality is problematic for phenomenalism; things in the world seem to affect one another causally in ways that are difficult to account for properly by mere reports of sense-experiences. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This is very interesting, and doesn't seem to have been enough to make A.J. Ayer eschew phenomenalism (Idea 5170). Once your metaphysics becomes realist (like Russell), your account of perception and objects has to change too. |
4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
Full Idea: An elephant may be fully represented by nine primitive shapes ('geons'), but it may require as few as three geons in appropriate relations to be correctly identified. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.7) | |
A reaction: Encouraging the idea of the mind as a maker of maps and models |
4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
Full Idea: A unique yellow experience may be evoked with monochrome light of 580nm, or a mixture of 540nm and 670nm. ..Our interpretation of colour experience is a highly idiosyncratic artefact of our visual system. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.117) | |
A reaction: This confirms what I have always thought - that colour (as qualia) is strictly a feature of minds, not of the world. |
4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Gestalt psychology claims that there are at least four unlearned factors in perceptual grouping - the principles of proximity (close things), of similarity, of good continuation (extending lines in a smooth course), and closure (which completes figures). | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.103) | |
A reaction: This offers a bridge between Hume's associationism and rationalist claims of innate ideas |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
Full Idea: Basing ethics on human flourishing tends towards utilitarianism or consequentialism; actions, character traits, laws, and so on are to be assessed with reference to their contributions to human flourishing. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.2) | |
A reaction: This raises the question of whether only virtue can contribute to flourishing, or whether a bit of vice might be helpful. This problem presumably pushed the Stoics to say that virtue itself is the good, rather than the resulting flourishing. |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
Full Idea: If we base our ethics on human flourishing, one implication would seem to be moral relativism, since what counts as 'flourishing' seems inevitably relative to one or other set of values. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.1) | |
A reaction: This remark seems to make the relativist assumption that all value systems are equal. For Aristotle, flourishing is no more relative than health is. No one can assert that illness has an intrinsically high value in human life. |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: In the beginning Russell's ontology included matter as basic, to be known, however, only by inference from sense-data. By the end he wanted to 'contruct' matter from sense-data. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1 | |
A reaction: [see also p.133] Russell always seems to have been a robust realist about the external world, but the later view seems a lot less realist than the earlier view. |