3 ideas
17699 | Variables are auxiliary notions, and not part of the 'eternal' essence of logic [Schönfinkel] |
Full Idea: A variable in a proposition of logic ....has the status of a mere auxiliary notion that is really inappropriate to the constant, 'eternal' essence of the propositions of logic. | |
From: Moses Schönfinkel (Building Blocks of Mathematical Logic [1924], §1) | |
A reaction: He presumably thinks that what the variables stand for (and he mentions 'argument places' and 'operators') will be included in the essence. My attention was caught by the thought that he takes logic to have an essence. |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects. | |
From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459 | |
A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale? |
7636 | It can't be more rational to believe in natural laws than miracles if the laws are not rational [Ishaq on Hume] |
Full Idea: In Hume's argument against miracles, how can it be more rational to believe the laws than the miracles, if the laws themselves are not based on reason? | |
From: comment on David Hume (Of Miracles [1748]) by Atif Ishaq - talk | |
A reaction: A very nice question. Hume never presents his argument with such an overt reliance on reason. But if the argument says you are in the 'habit' of expecting no anomalies in the laws, what is to prevent you changing the habit of a lifetime? |