6 ideas
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects. | |
| From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459 | |
| A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale? |
| 8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: It has been widely supposed that externalism, which holds that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are partly determined by factors of which the person may be ignorant, cannot be reconciled with first-person authority. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.197) | |
| A reaction: It is certainly a bit puzzling if you go around saying 'Actually, people don't know their own thoughts'. Davidson aims to defend first-person authority. The full story is developed in Tyler Burge's views on 'anti-individualism'. |
| 8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: It will explain a speaker's actions far better if we interpret him as he intended to be interpreted, than if we suppose he means and thinks what someone else might mean and think who used the same words 'correctly'. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.199) | |
| A reaction: This comes down to the fact that our actions have to be motivated by internal meanings. If I defer to experts on the essence of gold, I still buy gold according to how I myself understand it. So meaning has two components? |
| 8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: While I agree that the usual cause of the use of the word determines what it means, I do not see why sameness of microstructure is necessarily the relevant similarity that determines my reference of the word 'water'. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.198) | |
| A reaction: This is a problem for essentialists who build their views on semantic considerations. But the stability of what causes 'water' thoughts is the microstructure of water. However, that is an explantion of meaning, not a definition of it. |
| 7829 | God no more has human perfections than we have animal perfections [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: To ascribe to God those attributes which make a man perfect would be as wrong as to ascribe to a man the attributes that make perfect an elephant or an ass. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Blijenburgh [1665], 1665), quoted by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: This would be a difficulty for Aquinas's Fourth Way (Idea 1432), and one which I think Aquinas might acknowledge, given his desire that we should be humble when trying to comprehend God (Idea 1410). It leaves us struggling to grasp the concept of God. |
| 7830 | A talking triangle would say God is triangular [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: If a triangle could speak it would say that God is eminently triangular. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Blijenburgh [1665], 1665), quoted by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: Spinoza had a rather appealing waspish wit. This nicely dramatises an ancient idea (Idea 407). You can, of course, if you believe in God, infer some of His characteristics from His creation. But then see Hume: Ideas 1439, 6960, 6967, 1440. |