8 ideas
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
Full Idea: Evidentialism does not support beginning epistemology by taking for granted that evidentialism is true. ...Rather, what potentially justifies belief in intial epistemic data and initial procedures of inquiry is the evidence itself. | |
From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting') | |
A reaction: This sounds good. I much prefer talk of 'evidence' to talk of 'perceptions', because evidence has been licked into shape, and its significance has been clarified. That is the first step towards the coherence we seek. |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
Full Idea: Reliabilism would count pure guesses as good reasons if guessing were properly reliable. | |
From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting') | |
A reaction: See D.H. Lawrence's short story 'The Rocking Horse Winner'. This objection strikes me as being so devastating that it is almost conclusive. Except that pure guesses are never ever reliable, over a decent period of time. |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
Full Idea: Sheer reliability does not justify belief. ...It may be, for instance, that we have strong though misleading reason to deny the method's reliability. | |
From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Circles') | |
A reaction: That is, we accept a justification if we judge the method to be reliable, not if it IS reliable. I can disbelieve all the reliable information that arrives in my mind. People do that all the time! Hatred of experts! Support for internalism? |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
Full Idea: An unrefined reliability theory does a poor job at capturing reflective judgements about hypothetical cases | |
From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Stroud's') | |
A reaction: Reliability can only be a test for tried and tested ways. No one can say whether imagining a range of possibilities is reliable or not. Is prediction a reliable route to knowledge? |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects. | |
From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459 | |
A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale? |
12167 | Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Characteristic of expression is the presence of 'reference' without predication. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Representation in Music [1976], p.71) | |
A reaction: This echoes (in linguistic terms) Kant's thought that art is 'purposive without purpose'. The remark is comfortable in an essay on music, but it gets more tricky when the topic is literature, or even representational painting. |
12166 | If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If a passage carries a reference to love, we are not told what it says about love. And to speak of language with 'reference' but no predication is simply to misuse the word. We leave the realm of representation and enter that of expression. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Representation in Music [1976], p.63-4) | |
A reaction: This is a beautifully simple objection to the idea (associated with Nelson Goodman) that art is a language. Though what an 'expression' of something amounts to I am not quite sure. |
12168 | Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to the understanding of music. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Representation in Music [1976], p.74) | |
A reaction: I would not have thought that many people thought music was representational, but Scruton particularly mentions passages in opera that seem to pick up aspects of the story. Do even bell sounds not represent bells? |