Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'Formal and Transcendental Logic' and 'Political Liberalism'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

21222	Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: Husserl maintained that because most logicians have not studied the connection between logic and the world, logic did not achieve its status of purity. Even more, their logic implicitly presupposed a world.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
	A reaction: The point here is that the bracketing of phenomenology, to reach an understanding with no presuppositions, is impossible if you don't realise what your are presupposing. I think the logic/world relationship is badly neglected, thanks to Frege.

21223	Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: The phenomenological logic grounds logical notions in subjective acts of experience.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929], p.183) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
	A reaction: I'll approach this with great caution, but this is a line of thought that appeals to me. The core assumptions of logic do not arise ex nihilo.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics

21224	Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: Pure mathematics is the science of the relations between any object whatever (relation of whole to part, relation of equality, property, unity etc.). In this sense, pure mathematics is seen by Husserl as formal ontology.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.2
	A reaction: I would expect most modern analytic philosophers to agree with this. Modern mathematics (e.g. category theory) seems to have moved beyond this stage, but I still like this idea.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

8130	Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
	Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects.
	From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459
	A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale?

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability

21051	Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls]
	Full Idea: To check whether we are following public reason we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion?
	From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.254), quoted by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 10
	A reaction: A very nice practical implementation of Kantian universalisability. How would your opinion sound if it were written into a constitution?

24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract

21119	Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls]
	Full Idea: Exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to reason.
	From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.217), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 02
	A reaction: This is not the actual endorsement of Rousseau, or the tacit endorsement of Locke (by living there), but adds a Kantian appeal to a rational consensus, on which rational people should converge. Very Enlightenment. 'Hypothetical consent'.