Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'Formal and Transcendental Logic' and 'works'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

21222	Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: Husserl maintained that because most logicians have not studied the connection between logic and the world, logic did not achieve its status of purity. Even more, their logic implicitly presupposed a world.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
	A reaction: The point here is that the bracketing of phenomenology, to reach an understanding with no presuppositions, is impossible if you don't realise what your are presupposing. I think the logic/world relationship is badly neglected, thanks to Frege.

21223	Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: The phenomenological logic grounds logical notions in subjective acts of experience.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929], p.183) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
	A reaction: I'll approach this with great caution, but this is a line of thought that appeals to me. The core assumptions of logic do not arise ex nihilo.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics

21224	Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: Pure mathematics is the science of the relations between any object whatever (relation of whole to part, relation of equality, property, unity etc.). In this sense, pure mathematics is seen by Husserl as formal ontology.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.2
	A reaction: I would expect most modern analytic philosophers to agree with this. Modern mathematics (e.g. category theory) seems to have moved beyond this stage, but I still like this idea.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity

3144	Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler]
	Full Idea: Everything is what it is, and not another thing.
	From: Joseph Butler (works [1732]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 2.4

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

8130	Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
	Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects.
	From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459
	A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale?