Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty', 'Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason' and 'Croce and Collingwood'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

11 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
5062 First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We rise to metaphysics by saying 'nothing takes place without a reason', then asking 'why is there something rather than nothing?, and then 'why do things exist as they do?'
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §7)
     A reaction: Wonderful. This is what we pay philosophers for - to attempt to go to the heart of the mystery, and then start formulating the appropriate questions. The question of 'why this?' is the sweetest question. The first one seems a little intractable.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
19377 A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Each monad, together with a particular body, makes up a living substance. Thus, there is not only life everywhere, joined to limbs or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of life in the monads, some dominating more or less over others.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], 4)
     A reaction: Two key ideas: that each monad is linked to a body (which is presumably passive), and the infinite degrees of life in monads. Thus rocks consist of monads, but at an exceedingly low degree of life. They are stubborn and responsive.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
19353 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We distinguish between 'perception', the internal state of the monad representing external things, and 'apperception', which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §4)
     A reaction: The word 'apperception' is standard in Kant. I find it surprising that modern analytic philosophers don't seem to use it when they write about perception. It strikes me as useful, but maybe specialists have a reason for avoiding it.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
5061 Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is a connexion between the perceptions of animals, which bears some resemblance to reason: but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §5)
     A reaction: This amounts to the view that animals can do Humean induction (where you see regularities), but not Leibnizian induction (where you see necessities). I say all minds perceive patterns, but only humans can think about the patterns they have perceived.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
20416 By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp]
     Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
20417 Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp]
     Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood).
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that.
20419 We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp]
     Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing.
20418 The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp]
     Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art!
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
5063 Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Music charms us although its beauty only consists in the harmony of numbers.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §17)
     A reaction: 'Only'! This is a super-pythagorean view of music, as you might expect from a great mathematician. Did he understand the horrible compromises that had just been made to achieve even-tempered tuning? Patterns are the key, as always.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
5121 Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman]
     Full Idea: Basing ethics on human flourishing tends towards utilitarianism or consequentialism; actions, character traits, laws, and so on are to be assessed with reference to their contributions to human flourishing.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.2)
     A reaction: This raises the question of whether only virtue can contribute to flourishing, or whether a bit of vice might be helpful. This problem presumably pushed the Stoics to say that virtue itself is the good, rather than the resulting flourishing.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5120 What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman]
     Full Idea: If we base our ethics on human flourishing, one implication would seem to be moral relativism, since what counts as 'flourishing' seems inevitably relative to one or other set of values.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.1)
     A reaction: This remark seems to make the relativist assumption that all value systems are equal. For Aristotle, flourishing is no more relative than health is. No one can assert that illness has an intrinsically high value in human life.