3 ideas
11052 | Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege] |
Full Idea: With the psychological conception of logic we lose the distinction between the grounds that justify a conviction and the causes that actually produce it. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Logic [1897] [1897]) | |
A reaction: Thus Frege kicked the causal theory of justification well into touch long before it had even been properly formulated. That is not to say that there is no psychological aspect to logic, because there is. |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects. | |
From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459 | |
A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale? |
22393 | I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot] |
Full Idea: I am sure I do not understand the idea of a reason for acting, and I wonder whether anyone else does either. I incline to the view that all such reasons depend either on the agent's interests (meaning here what is in his interest) or else on his desires. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Reasons for Actions and Desires [1972], p.156 Post) | |
A reaction: It seems common to assume that a reason for an action must be something rational, but it makes sense to say that the reason for someone's action was an irrational whim. Is the reason for an action just the cause of the action? |