Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'Truth and Method' and 'Concepts of supervenience'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
22333 Only language is understandable Being [Gadamer]
     Full Idea: Being that can be understood is language.
     From: Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truth and Method [1960], p.450), quoted by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 5.2
     A reaction: [also 1967 p.19] Glock quotes this to show that continental philosophers are just as linguistic in their approach as the analytic school. I think the main aim of representational painting is to grasp non-linguistic Being.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
3536 Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim]
     Full Idea: Each supervenient property necessarily has a coextensive property in the base family.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Concepts of supervenience [1984], §5)
     A reaction: This is presumably the minimum requirement for a situation of supervenience. How do you decide which property is the 'base' property? Do we just mean that the base causes the other, but not vice versa?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
8130 Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
     Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects.
     From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459
     A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
20928 Facts don't oppose values; they are integrated into each person's aspirations [Gadamer, by Zimmermann,J]
     Full Idea: Gadamer shows that we cannot oppose facts to values, but that all facts are integrated into meaningful wholes through a personal commitment to some kind of vision of how things ought to be.
     From: report of Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truth and Method [1960]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction
     A reaction: Straw man here. Whoever said that facts were 'opposed' to values? Certainly not David Hume. Any sensible empiricist of that type would try to develop values that integrated nicely with the facts. Gadamer seems to be denying facts.