3 ideas
9916 | Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no! [Poincaré, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Poincaré once exclaimed, 'Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no!'. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (talk [1901]) by Hilary Putnam - Models and Reality | |
A reaction: An interesting view. It mustn't be assumed that conventions are not rooted in something. Maybe a sort of pragmatism is implied. |
8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |
Full Idea: Given that sense experiential states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content, ...where a mental state with conceptual content is one where the content is of a possible judgement by the subject. | |
From: Bill Brewer (Perceptual experience has conceptual content [2005], I) | |
A reaction: This is, I believe, wrong. Even complex observations, like a pool of blood, only become reasons when they have been interpreted. Otherwise they are just the raw ingredients of evidence. How could an uninterpreted red patch be a 'reason'? |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects. | |
From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459 | |
A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale? |