4 ideas
16740 | A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella] |
Full Idea: A power is not the cause of an operation, but only the cause's aptitude for operating. | |
From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], De fac anim 4:col 692), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5 | |
A reaction: His example is the power of running, which is actually caused by the soul (or whatever), which generates the power. A power is a very superficial thing. |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects. | |
From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459 | |
A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale? |
15666 | To understand language is to know how to use it to reach shared understandings [Habermas] |
Full Idea: One simply would not know what it is to understand the meaning of a linguistic expression if one did not know how one could make use of it in order to reach understanding with someone about something. | |
From: Jürgen Habermas (On the Pragmatics of Communications [1998], p.228), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:34 | |
A reaction: Not offered as a 'theory of meaning', and certainly plausible. Compare a hammer, though: a proper understanding is that it is used to exert a sharp force, but you can take in its structure and nature before you spot its usage. |
16571 | Prime matter is exceptionally obscure [Zabarella] |
Full Idea: Nothing in the natural world seems to be more obscure and difficult to grasp than the prime matter of things. | |
From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], I.1 col 133), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 2.1 | |
A reaction: This spells the beginning of the end for 'prime matter', since a late scholastic is doubting it, even before the scientists got to work. Most modern Aristotelians slide quietly past prime matter, as unhelpful. |