Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'Letters to William Molyneux' and 'Freedom and Action'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

12812	Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
	Full Idea: This I do say, that there are real constitutions in things from whence simple ideas flow, which we observe combin'd in them. But we distinguish particular substances into sorts or genera not by real essences or constitutions, but by observed simple ideas.
	From: John Locke (Letters to William Molyneux [1692], 1693.01.20)
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I can find of Locke's position on essences. He is totally committed to their reality, but strongly aware of the empirical constraints which keep us from direct knowledge of them. He would be amazed by modern discoveries.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

8130	Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
	Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects.
	From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459
	A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale?

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory

20062	If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
	Full Idea: If someone wants to kill his uncle to inherit a fortune, and having this desire makes him so agitated that he loses control of his car and kills a pedestrian, who turns out to be his uncle, the conditions of the causal theory seem to be satisfied.
	From: Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966]), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Deviant'
	A reaction: This line of argument has undermined all sorts of causal theories that were fashionable in the 1960s and 70s. Explanation should lead to understanding, but a deviant causal chain doesn't explain the outcome. The causal theory can be tightened.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation

20054	There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm]
	Full Idea: There must be some event A, presumably some cerebral event, which is not caused by any other event, but by the agent.
	From: Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966], p.20), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 4 'Agent'
	A reaction: I'm afraid this thought strikes me as quaintly ridiculous. What kind of metaphysics can allow causation outside the natural nexus, yet occuring within the physical brain? This is a relic of religious dualism. Let it go.