2427
|
Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
|
|
Full Idea:
Searle originally directed the Chinese Room against machine intentionality rather than consciousness, arguing that it is "understanding" that the room lacks,….but on Searle's view intentionality requires consciousness.
|
|
From:
report of John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 4.9.4
|
|
A reaction:
I doubt whether 'understanding' is a sufficiently clear and distinct concept to support Searle's claim. Understanding comes in degrees, and we often think and act with minimal understanding.
|
7390
|
If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
|
|
Full Idea:
The argument that begins "this little bit of brain activity doesn't understand Chinese, and neither does this bigger bit..." is headed for the unwanted conclusion that even the activity of the whole brain won't account for understanding Chinese.
|
|
From:
comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
|
|
A reaction:
In other words, Searle is guilty of a fallacy of composition (in negative form - parts don't have it, so whole can't have it). Dennett is right. The whole shebang of the full brain will obviously do wonderful (and commonplace) things brain bits can't.
|
11911
|
Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn]
|
|
Full Idea:
The history of moral theory is largely a history of battles between people who want more (truth, absolutes...) - Plato, Locke, Cudworth, Kant, Nagel - and people content with what we have (nature) - Aristotle, Epicurus, Hobbes, Hume, Stevenson.
|
|
From:
Simon Blackburn (Précis of 'Ruling Passions' [2002], p.133)
|
|
A reaction:
[Thanks to Neil Sinclair for this one] As a devotee of Aristotle, I like this. I'm always impressed, though, by people who go the extra mile in morality, because they are in the grips of purer and loftier ideals than I am. They also turn into monsters!
|
5121
|
Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman]
|
|
Full Idea:
Basing ethics on human flourishing tends towards utilitarianism or consequentialism; actions, character traits, laws, and so on are to be assessed with reference to their contributions to human flourishing.
|
|
From:
Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.2)
|
|
A reaction:
This raises the question of whether only virtue can contribute to flourishing, or whether a bit of vice might be helpful. This problem presumably pushed the Stoics to say that virtue itself is the good, rather than the resulting flourishing.
|