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16744
|
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
There are no powers in stones and plants that are not so mysterious that they cannot be explained …from principles that are known to all and admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position, and motion of particles of matter.
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|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], IV.187), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
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A reaction:
This is an invocation of 'categorical' properties, against dispositions. I take this to be quite wrong. The explanation goes the other way. What supports the structures; what drives the motion; what initiates anything?
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|
5016
|
Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
The five commonly enumerated universals are: genus, species, difference, property and accident.
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|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59)
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A reaction:
Interestingly, this seems to be Descartes passing on his medieval Aristotelian inheritance, in which things are defined by placing them in a class, and then noting what distinguishes them within that class.
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|
16633
|
A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
Each substance has one principal property that constitutes its nature and essence, to which all its other properties are referred. Extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought of thinking substances.
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|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.53), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.3
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A reaction:
Property is likely to be 'propria', which is a property distinctive of some thing, not just any old modern property. This is quite a strikingly original view of the nature of essence. Descartes despised 'substantial forms'.
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|
5005
|
I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
There is a contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does not (at the same time as it thinks) exist. Hence this conclusion I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly way.
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|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.07)
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A reaction:
The classic statement of his argument. The significance here is that it seems to have the structure of an argument, as it involves 'philosophising', which leads to a 'contradiction', and hence to the famous conclusion. It is not just intuitive.
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|
5006
|
'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
By the word 'thought' I understand everything we are conscious of as operating in us. And that is why not only understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thinking.
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|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.09)
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|
A reaction:
There is a bit of tension here between Descartes' correct need to include feeling in thought for his Cogito argument, and his tendency to dismiss animal consciousness, on the grounds that they only sense things, and don't make judgements.
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|
5012
|
'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
The proposition 'nothing comes from nothing' is not to be considered as an existing thing, or the mode of a thing, but as a certain eternal truth which has its seat in our mind and is a common notion or axiom.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.49)
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|
A reaction:
There is a tension here, in his assertion that it is 'eternal', but 'not existing'. How does one distinguish an innate idea from an innate truth? 'Eternal' sounds like an external guarantee of truth, but being 'in our mind' sounds less reliable.
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|
5004
|
We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
It is on the Principles, or first causes, that the knowledge of other things depends, so the Principles can be known without these last, but the other things cannot reciprocally be known without the Principles.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref)
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|
A reaction:
A particularly strong assertion of foundationalism, as it says that not only must the foundations exist, but also we must actually know them. This sounds false, as elementary knowledge then seems to require far too much sophistication.
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|
5011
|
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
I observe two ultimate classes of things: intellectual or thinking things, pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance, and material things, pertaining to extended substance or to body.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.48)
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|
A reaction:
This is clear confirmation that Descartes believed the mind is a substance, rather than an insubstantial world of thinking. It leaves open the possibility of a different theory: that mind is not a substance, but is a Platonic adjunct to reality.
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|
5018
|
Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
Even if we suppose God had united a body and a soul so closely that they couldn't be closer, and made a single thing out of the two, they would still remain distinct, because God has the power of separating them, or conserving out without the other.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60)
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|
A reaction:
If Descartes lost his belief in God (after discussing existence with Kant) would he cease to be a dualist? This quotation seems to be close to conceding a mind-body relationship more like supervenience than interaction.
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|
5008
|
The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
That the will should extend widely accords with its nature, and it is the greatest perfection in man to be able to act by its means, that is, freely, and by so doing we are in peculiar way masters of our actions, and thereby merit praise or blame.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.37)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to me to be a deep-rooted and false understanding which philosophy has inherited from theology. It doesn't strike me that there must an absolute 'buck-stop' to make us responsible. Why is it better for a decision to appear out of nowhere?
|
|
15987
|
Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
I do not accept or desire any other principle in physics than in geometry or abstract mathematics, because all the phenomena of nature may be explained by their means, and sure demonstrations can be given of them.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.64), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 7
|
|
A reaction:
This is his famous and rather extreme view, which might be described as hyper-pythagoreanism (by adding geometry to numbers). It seems to leave out matter, forces and activity.
|
|
16601
|
Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
The nature of matter, or body viewed as a whole, consists not in its being something which is hard, heavy, or colored, or which in any other way affects the senses, but only in its being a thing extended in length, breadth and depth.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.5
|
|
10359
|
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
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|
Full Idea:
The questions about causation concern their relata (in space-time, how fine-grained, how many?) and the metaphysics (distinguish causal sequences from others, the direction of causation, selecting causes among pre-conditions?).
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], Intro)
|
|
A reaction:
A very nice map (which has got me thinking about restructuring this database). I can't think of a better way to do philosophy than this (let's hear it for analysis - but the greatest role models for the approach are Aristotle and Aquinas).
|
|
10372
|
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
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|
Full Idea:
It is not clear whether causation is transitive. For example, if a boulder roll's towards a hiker's head, causing the hiker to duck, which causes the hiker to survive, it does not seem that the rolling boulder causes the survival of the hiker.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
|
|
A reaction:
Maybe survival is not an event or an effect. How many times have I survived in my life? We could, though, say that the hiker strained a muscle as he or she ducked. But then it is unclear whether the boulder caused the muscle-strain.
|
|
10374
|
There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
Theories of causal connection are: nomological subsumption, statistical correlation, counterfactual dependence, agential manipulability, contiguous change, energy flow, physical processes, property transference, primitivism and eliminativism.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
|
|
A reaction:
Schaffer reduces these to probability and process. I prefer the latter. The first two are wrong, the third right but superficial, the fourth wrong, the fifth, sixth and seventh on the right lines, the eighth wrong, the ninth tempting, and the last wrong.
|
|
10377
|
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
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|
Full Idea:
One problem case for the process view of causation is 'disconnection'. If a brick breaks a window by being fired from a catapult, a latch is released which was preventing the catapult from firing, so the 'process' is just internal to the catapult.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.1)
|
|
A reaction:
Schaffer says the normal reply is to deny that the catch-releasing is genuinely causal. I would have thought we should go more fine-grained, and identify linked components of the causal process.
|
|
10375
|
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
The traditional view that the direction of causation is the direction of time has been challenged, by the direction of forking, by overdetermination, by independence, and by manipulation, which all seem to be one-directional features.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
|
|
A reaction:
Personally I incline to the view that time is prior, and fixes the direction of causation. I'm not sure that 'backward causation' can be stated coherently, even if it is metaphysically or naturally possible.
|
|
10389
|
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
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|
Full Idea:
Reasons for causal order being temporal order are that otherwise the effect might occur but the cause then get prevented, ..and that they must be the same, because the temporal order can only be analysed in terms of the causal order.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2)
|
|
A reaction:
If one took both time and causation as primitive, then the second argument would be void. The first argument, though, sounds pretty overwhelming to me.
|
|
10390
|
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
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|
Full Idea:
Reasons for denying that causal order is temporal order are that time travel seems possible, that cause and effect can be simultaneous, because joint effects have temporal order without causal connection, and because backward causation may exist.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2)
|
|
A reaction:
The possibility of time travel and backward causation can clearly be doubted, and certainly can't be grounds for one's whole metaphysics. The other two need careful analysis, but I think they can be answered. Causation is temporal.
|
|
10380
|
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
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|
Full Idea:
Primitivism arises from our failure to reduce causation, but also from causation being too central to reduce. The probability and process accounts are said to be inevitably circular, as they cannot be understood without reference to causation.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
|
|
A reaction:
This is very tempting. The primitive view, though, must deal with the direction problem, which may suggest that time is even more primitive. Can we have a hierarchy of primitiveness? To be alive is to be causal.
|
|
10385
|
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
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|
Full Idea:
The three main objections to causation being primitive are that causation can't be anything more than what we observe, or that such a primitive is too spooky to be acceptable, or that primitivism leads to elimination of causation.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
|
|
A reaction:
[summarised] I don't like the first (Humean) view. I suspect that anything which we finally decide has to be primitive (time, for example) is going to be left looking 'spooky', and I suspect that eliminativism is just Humeanism in disguise.
|
|
10387
|
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
The concepts of 'event', 'law', 'cause' and 'explanation' are nomic concepts which serve to allow a systematic understanding of science; they do not themselves appear in the equations.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
|
|
A reaction:
This is a criticism of Russell's attempt to eliminate causation from science. It shows that there has to be something we can call 'metascience', which is the province of philosophers, since scientists don't have much interest in it.
|
|
10388
|
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
Causation can't be eliminated if it is needed to explain persistence, explanation, disposition, perception, warrant, action, responsibility, mental functional role, conceptual content, and reference. It's elimination would be catastrophic.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed list] I think I am going to vote for the view that causation is one of the primitives in the metaphysics of nature, so I have to agree with this. Most of the listed items, though, are controversial, so eliminativists are not defeated.
|
|
10384
|
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
Causation seems to be primitive if the same laws and patterns of events might embody three different possible causes, as when two magicians cast the same successful spell, each with a 50% chance of success, and who was successful is unclear.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
|
|
A reaction:
I'm cautious when the examples involve magic. It implies that the process that leads to the result will be impossible to observe, but if magic never really happens, then the patterns of events will always be different.
|
|
10386
|
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
The view that causation is primitive can be defended against Humean critics by saying that causation can be directly observed in the will or our bodies, or that it can be inferred as the best explanation.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
|
|
A reaction:
I like both views, and have just converted myself to the primitivist view of causation! I can't know the essence of a tree, because I am not a tree, but I can know the essence of causation. The Greek fascination with explaining movement is linked.
|
|
10361
|
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
Events are relatively coarse-grained, unlike facts; so the event of John's saying 'hello' seems to be the same event as John's saying 'hello' loudly, while they seem to be different facts.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
The example seems good support for facts, since saying 'hello' loudly could have quite different effects from just saying 'hello'. I also incline temperamentally towards a fine-grained account, because it is more reductivist.
|
|
10360
|
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
The standard view make causal relata events (Davidson, Kim, Lewis), but there is considerable support for facts (Bennett, Mellor), and occasional support for features (Dretske), tropes (Campbell), states of affairs (Armstrong), and situations and aspects.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
An event is presumed to be concrete, while a fact is more abstract (a proposition, perhaps). I'm always drawn to 'processes' (because they are good for discussing the mind), so an event, as a sort of natural process, looks good.
|
|
10368
|
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
Theorists who reject both events and facts as causal relata do so because the relata must be immanent in nature, and thus not facts, but also fine-grained and thus not events.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
|
|
A reaction:
Kim, however, offers a fine-grained account of events (as triples), and Bennett individuates them even more finely (as propositions), so events might be saved. Descriptions can be very fine-grained.
|
|
10383
|
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
The primitivist about causation might say that the notion of an event (or other relata) cannot be understood without reference to causation, because properties themselves are individuated by their causal role.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
|
|
A reaction:
Having enthusiastically embraced the causal view of properties (see Shoemaker and Ellis), I suddenly realise that I seem required to embrace primitivism about causation, which I hadn't anticipated! I've no immediate problem with that.
|