3 ideas
| 11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
| Full Idea: Propensities should not be regarded as inherent in an object, such as a die or a penny, but should be regarded as inherent in a situation (of which, of course, the object was part). | |
| From: Karl Popper (A World of Propensities [1993], p.14), quoted by George Molnar - Powers 6.2 | |
| A reaction: Molnar argues against this claim, and I agree with him. We can see why Popper might prefer this relational view, given that powers often only become apparent in unusual relational situations. |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects. | |
| From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459 | |
| A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale? |
| 5470 | The idea of laws of nature arose in the Middle Ages [Hall,AR, by Ellis] |
| Full Idea: According to A.R. Hall, the idea that nature is governed by laws does not appear to have existed in the ancient Greek, Roman or Far Eastern traditions of science, but arose from religious, philosophical and legal ideas in medieval Europe. | |
| From: report of A.R. Hall (The Scientific Revolution 1500-1800 [1954]) by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: This is a very illuminating point, which gives good circumstantial support for questioning the existence of external laws which are imposed on a passive nature. Modern essentialism suggest the 'laws' are the intrinsic results of properties. |