95 ideas
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
| A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
| A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
| A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
| A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
| A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
| A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
| A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
| A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
| A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
| A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
| A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
| A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
| A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
| A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
| A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
| A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
| A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
| A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
| A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
| A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
| A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
| A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
| A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theos: god | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
| 15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: If there is no way of settling metaphysical questions, then who cares whether or not they make sense? | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 4 n20) | |
| A reaction: This footnote is aimed at logical positivists, who seemed to worry about whether metaphysics made sense, and also dismissed its prospects even if it did make sense. |
| 15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The 'quietist' view of metaphysics says that realist metaphysics should be abandoned, not because its questions cannot be framed, but because their answers cannot be found. The real world of metaphysics is akin to Kant's noumenal world. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 4) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Blackburn, Dworkin, A.Fine, and Putnam-1987 as quietists] Fine aims to clarify the concepts of factuality and of ground, in order to show that metaphysics is possible. |
| 15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: My main objection to Fine's notion of grounding as fundamental is that it violates 'purity' - that fundamental truths should involve only fundamental notions. | |
| From: comment on Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 08.2 | |
| A reaction: [p.106 of Sider for 'purity'] The point here is that to define a grounding relation you have to mention the 'higher' levels of the relationship (as in a 'city' being grounded in physical stuff), which doesn't seem fundamental enough. |
| 15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
| Full Idea: When p 'grounds' q then q holds in virtue of p's holding; q's holding is nothing beyond p's holding; the truth of p explains the truth of q in a particularly tight sense (explanation of q by p in this sense requires that p necessitates q). | |
| From: report of Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 15-16) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 08.1 | |
| A reaction: This proposal has become a hot topic in current metaphysics, as attempts are made to employ 'grounding' in various logical, epistemological and ontological contexts. I'm a fan - it is at the heart of metaphysics as structure of reality. |
| 15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: I recommend that a statement of ground be cast in the following 'canonical' form: Its being the case that S consists in nothing more than its being the case that T, U... (where S, T, U... are particular sentences). | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5) | |
| A reaction: The point here is that grounding is to be undestood in terms of sentences (and 'its being the case that...'), rather than in terms of objects, properties or relations. Fine thus makes grounding a human activity, rather than a natural activity. |
| 15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: One line of reduction is logical analysis. To say one sentence reduces to another is to say that they express the same proposition (or fact), but the grammatical form of the second is closer to the logical form than the grammatical form of the first. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3) | |
| A reaction: Fine objects that S-and-T reduces to S and T, which is two propositions. He also objects that this approach misses the de re ingredient in reduction (that it is about the things themselves, not the sentences). It also overemphasises logical form. |
| 15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: A second line of reduction is semantic, and holds in virtue of the meaning of the sentences. It should then be possible to acquire an understanding of the reduced sentence on the basis of understanding the sentences to which it reduces. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3) | |
| A reaction: Fine says this avoids the first objection to the grammatical approach (see Reaction to Idea 15050), but still can't handle the de re aspect of reduction. Fine also doubts whether this understanding qualifies as 'reduction'. |
| 15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The third, more recent, approach to reduction is a modal matter. A class of propositions will reduce to - or supervene upon - another if, necessarily, any truth from the one is entailed by truths from the other. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Armstrong, Chalmers and Jackson for this approach] Fine notes that some people reject supervenience as a sort of reduction. He objects that this reduction doesn't necessarily lead to something more basic. |
| 15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The notion of ground should be distinguished from the strict notion of reduction. A statement of reduction implies the unreality of what is reduced, but a statement of ground does not. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5) | |
| A reaction: That seems like a bit of a caricature of reduction. If you see a grey cloud and it reduces to a swarm of mosquitoes, you do not say that the cloud was 'unreal'. Fine is setting up a stall for 'ground' in the metaphysical market. We all seek structure. |
| 15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: I conclude that there is a primitive metaphysical concept of reality, one that cannot be understood in fundamentally different terms. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Fine offers arguments to support his claim, but it seems hard to disagree with. The only alternative I can see is to understand reality in terms of our experiences, and this is the road to metaphysical hell. |
| 15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We may grant that some things are explanatorily more basic than others, but why should that make them more real? | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 8) | |
| A reaction: This is the question asked by the 'quietist'. Fine's answer is that our whole conception of Reality, with its intrinsic structure, is what lies at the basis, and this is primitive. |
| 15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The first main approach says metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'objective' or 'factual'. ...According to the second conception, metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'irreducible' or 'fundamental'. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 1) | |
| A reaction: Fine is defending the 'fundamental' approach, via the 'grounding' relation. The whole structure, though, seems to be reality. In particular, a complete story must include the relations which facilitate more than mere fundamentals. |
| 15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Questions of what is real are to be settled upon the basis of considerations of ground. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This looks like being one of Fine's most important ideas, which is shifting the whole basis of contemporary metaphysics. Only Parmenides and Heidegger thought Being was the target. Aristotle aims at identity. What grounds what is a third alternative. |
| 15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: As long as colour terms pick out fundamental physical properties, I would be willing to countenance their use in the description of Reality in itself, ..even if they are based on a peculiar form of sensory awareness. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 8) | |
| A reaction: This seems to explain why metaphysicians are so fond of using colour as their example of a property, when it seems rather subjective. There seem to be good reasons for rejecting Fine's view. |
| 15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The main sources of evidence for judgments of ground are intuitive and explanatory. The relationship of ground is a form of explanation, ..explaining what makes a proposition true, which needs simplicity, breadth, coherence, non-circularity and strength. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 7) | |
| A reaction: My thought is that not only must grounding explain, and therefore be a good explanation, but that the needs of explanation drive our decisions about what are the grounds. It is a bit indeterminate which is tail and which is dog. |
| 15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We take ground to be an explanatory relation: if the truth that P is grounded in other truths, then they account for its truth; P's being the case holds in virtue of the other truths' being the case. ...It is the ultimate form of explanation. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5) | |
| A reaction: To be 'ultimate' that which grounds would have to be something which thwarted all further explanation. Popper, for example, got quite angry at the suggestion that we should put a block on further investigation in this way. |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects. | |
| From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459 | |
| A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale? |
| 15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: A proposition essentially contains a given constituent if its replacement by some other constituent induces a shift in truth value. Thus Socrates is essential to the proposition that Socrates is a philosopher, but not to Socrates is self-identical. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 6) | |
| A reaction: In this view the replacement of 'is' by 'isn't' would make 'is' (or affirmation) part of the essence of most propositions. This is about linguistic essence, rather than real essence. It has the potential to be trivial. Replace 'slightly' by 'fairly'? |