71 ideas
12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori, and not from the order of the phenomena alone. ... For the senses put nothing forward concerning metaphysical matters. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: Nice instance of the aspirations of big metaphysics, before Kant cut it down to size. The claim is not far off Plato's, that by dialectic we can work out the necessities of the Forms, to which even the gods must bow. Are necessities really kept from us? |
12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
Full Idea: In reasoning you try among other things to increase the explanatory coherence of your view. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.2.2) | |
A reaction: Harman is a champion of inference to the best explanation (abduction), and I agree with him. I think this idea extends to give us a view of justification as coherence, and that extends from inner individual coherence to socially extended coherence. |
12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
Full Idea: Conservatism is important; you should continue to believe as you do in the absence of any special reason to doubt your view, and in reasoning you should try to minimize change in your initial opinions in attaining other goals of reasoning. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.2.6) | |
A reaction: One of those principles like Ockham's Razor, which feels right but hard to justify. It seems the wrong principle for someone who can reason well, but has been brainwashed into a large collection of daft beliefs. Japanese soldiers still fighting WWII. |
5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The concept of truth was originated by the senses. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.479) | |
A reaction: This is a refreshing challenge to the modern view of truth, which seems entirely entangled with language. Truth seems a useful concept when discussing the workings of an animal mind. As you get closer to an object, you see it more 'truly'. |
12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
Full Idea: There is as yet no substantial theory of inference or reasoning. To be sure, logic is well developed; but logic is not a theory of inference or reasoning. Logic is a theory of implication and inconsistency. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.2.2) | |
A reaction: One problem is that animals can draw inferences without the use of language, and I presume we do so all the time, so it is hard to see how to formalise such an activity. |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
Full Idea: Principles of implication imply there is not a purely probabilistic rule of acceptance for belief. Otherwise one might accept P and Q, without accepting their conjunction, if the conjuncts have a high probability, but the conjunction doesn't. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.2.2) | |
A reaction: [Idea from Scott Soames] I am told that my friend A has just won a very big lottery prize, and am then told that my friend B has also won a very big lottery prize. The conjunction seems less believable; I begin to suspect a conspiracy. |
12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If that substantial chain [vinculum substantiale] for monads did not exist, all bodies, together with all of their qualities, would be nothing but well-founded phenomena, like a rainbow or an image in a mirror, continual dreams perfectly in agreement. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05) | |
A reaction: [The first appearance, apparently, of the 'susbtantial chain' in his writings] I take this to be a hugely significant move, either a defeat for monads, or the arrival of common sense. Spiritual monads must unify things, so they can't just be 'parallel'. |
12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Monads do not constitute a complete composite substance, since they make up, not something one per se, but only a mere aggregate, unless some substantial chain is added. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.05.26) | |
A reaction: This is the clearest statement in the Des Bosses letters of the need for something extra to unite monads. Since the main role of monads was to replace substances, which are only postulated to provide unity, this is rather a climb-down. |
12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Monads aren't a principle of operation for things outside of themselves. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: This is why Leibniz has got into a tangle, and is proposing his 'substantial chain' to join the monads together. I suspect that he would have dumped monads if he had lived a bit longer. |
12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
Full Idea: Reality is what is invariant among true complete theories. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.2.4) | |
A reaction: The sort of slogan that gets coined in the age of Quine. The whole manner of starting from your theories and working out to what we think reality is seems to be putting the cart before the horse. |
12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I do not say there is a chain midway between matter and form, but that the substantial form and primary matter of the composite, in the Scholastic sense (the primitive power, active and passive) are in the chain, and in the essence of the composite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: Note that this implies an essence of primitive power, and not just a collection of all properties. This is the clearest account in these letters of the nature of the 'substantial chain' he has added to his monads. |
12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The first entelechy of a composite is a constitutive part of the composite substance, namely its primitive force. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: For me, Leibniz's most interesting proposal is to characterise Aristotelian 'form' as an active thing, which offers an intrinsic account of movement, and a bottom level for explanations. There always remains the inexplicable. Why anything? Why this? |
12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Important relations are duration (order of successive things) and position (order of coexisting things) and interaction. Position without a thing mediating is presence. Beyond these is connection when things move one another. Thus things seem to be one. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is the best account I can find of his epistemological angle on the unity of things. They are symptoms of the inner power of unification, and he says that God sees these relations most clearly. |
12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every substance is alive. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05) | |
A reaction: The most charitable interpretation of this is that substances are what have unity, and the best model of unity that we can grasp is the unity of an organism. The less charitable view is that he literally thinks a pebble is 'alive'. Hm. |
12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Some realising thing must bring it about that composite substance contains something substantial besides monads, otherwise composites will be mere phenomena. The scholastics' active and passive powers are the substantial bond I am urging. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.01.13), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This appears to be a major retreat, in the last year of Leibniz's life, from the full monadology he had espoused. How do monads connect to matter, and thus unify it? He is returning to Aristotelian hylomorphism. |
12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An aggregate, but not a composite substance, is resolved into parts. A composite substance only needs the coming together of parts, but is not essentially constituted by them, otherwise it would be an aggregate. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: The point is that there is more to some things than there mere parts. Only some unifying principle, in addition to the mere parts, bestows a unity. Mereology is a limited activity if it has nothing to say about this issue. |
12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is a reason why not every possible thing exists. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: This is the kind of wonderful speculative metaphysical remark that we are not allowed to make any more. Needless to say, he doesn't tell us what the reason is. Overcrowding, perhaps. |
5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: What can be a surer guide to the distinction of true from false than our own senses? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.700) | |
A reaction: This doesn't say they are the only guide, which leaves room for guides such as what is consistent or self-evident or inferred. There is enough here, though, to show that the Epicureans were empiricists in a fairly modern way. |
5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The structure of your reasoning must be rickety and defective, if the senses on which it rests are themselves deceptive. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.518) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as one of the most basic tenets of empiricism. It denies the existence of 'pure' reason, and instead asserts that it is built out of complex and abstracted sense experience, which makes it ultimately a second-class citizen. |
5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If a belief resting directly on the foundation of the senses is not valid, there will be no standard to which we can refer any doubt on obscure questions for rational confirmation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.422) | |
A reaction: A classic statement of empiricist foundationalism. The Epicureans don't appear to have any time for a priori truths at all. I wonder if they settled mathematical disputes by counting objects and drawing diagrams? |
5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Paradoxical experiences (such a dreams and illusions) cannot shake our faith in the senses. Most of the illusion is due to the mental assumptions we ourselves superimpose, so that things not perceived by the senses pass for perceptions. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.462) | |
A reaction: Some misinterpretations of the senses, such as thinking a square tower round, are the result of foolish lack of judgement, but actual delusions within the senses, such as a ringing in the ears, or a pain in a amputated leg, seem like real sense failures. |
12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In the mutual agreement of perceivers consists the truth of the phenomena. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: This remark is startling close to the 'perspectivism' that crops up in the late notebooks of Nietzsche. Leibniz was keen on relativism in many areas, starting with the nature of space. I personally think Leibniz meant 'knowledge' rather than 'truth'. |
5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: No fact is so simple that it is not harder to believe than to doubt at the first presentation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1022) | |
A reaction: Hence induction is just 'drumming it in' until you come to believe it. There are good evolutionary reasons why we should be like this, because we would otherwise believe all sorts of silly half-perceptions in the gloaming. |
5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The guiding principle of the whole body is the mind or intellect, which is firmly lodged in the mid-region of the breast. Here is felt fear and alarm, and the caressing pulse of joy. Here, then is the seat of the intellect and mind. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.140) | |
A reaction: Even by this date thinking people were not clear that the mind is in the brain. They paid insufficient attention to head injuries. The emotions are felt to have a location, but intellect and principles are not. |
5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: First, I maintain that the mind, which we often call the intellect, the seat of guidance and control of life, is part of a man, no less than hand or foot or eyes are parts of a whole living creature. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.95) | |
A reaction: Presumably Lucretius asserts this because some people were denying it. Sounds like common sense to me. The only reason I can see for anyone denying what he says is if they are desperate to survive death. |
21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: No single element [of the soul] can be separated, nor can their capacities be divided spatially; they are like the multiple powers of a single body | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.262), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 2.7 | |
A reaction: It is interesting that this comes from someone with a strongly physicalist view of the mind (though not, if I recall, focusing on the brain). He is still totally impressed by the unified phenomenology of mental experience. He is an empiricist. |
12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
Full Idea: There is no natural border between inner and outer. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.3.4) | |
A reaction: Perhaps this is the key idea for the anti-individualist view of mind. Subjectively I would have to accept this idea, but looking objectively at another person it seems self-evident nonsense. |
12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
Full Idea: No one has ever described a way of explaining what beliefs, desires, and other mental states are except in terms of actual or possible relations to things in the external world. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.3.4) | |
A reaction: If I pursue my current favourite idea, that how we explain things is the driving force in what ontology we adopt, then this way of seeing the mind, and taking an externalist anti-individualist view of it seems quite attractive. |
12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
Full Idea: According to functionalism, the way things look to you is a relational characteristic of your experience, not part of its intrinsic character. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.3.3) | |
A reaction: No, can't make sense of that. How would being in a relation determine what something is? Similar problems with the structuralist account of mathematics. If the whole family love some one cat or one dog, the only difference is intrinsic to the animal. |
5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The fact that the mind itself has no internal necessity to determine its every act and compel it to suffer in helpless passivity - this is due to the slight swerve of the atoms at no determinate time or place. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.294) | |
A reaction: No one likes this proposal much, but it is very intriguing. The Epicureans had seen a problem, one which doesn't bother me much. If, nowadays, you are a reductive physicalist who believes in free will, you have a philosophical nightmare ahead of you. |
5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing can touch or be touched except body. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.303) | |
A reaction: This is the key objection to interactionism, and the main reason why the atomists have a thoroughly material view of the mind. It is an induction from a very large number of instances, but the argument is not, of course, conclusive. |
5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The earth is and always has been an insentient being. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.658) | |
A reaction: The fact that Epicurus needs to deny this shows that some idea close to panpsychism must still have been around in his time. He is discussing gods at the time, so maybe pantheism was the view being attacked, but that is a subset of panpsychism. |
5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: There is the possibility that particles have senses like those of an animate being as a whole, …but from the fact that we perceive eggs turning into live fledglings, we may infer that sense can be generated from the insentient. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.914) | |
A reaction: He gives other arguments for his view. The egg example is not a strong argument, but is precisely our puzzle of how consciousness can emerge from the process of evolution, and natural selection makes dualism look unlikely. |
5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Mind and spirit are both composed of matter, as we see them propelling limbs, rousing the body from sleep, changing the expression of the face, and guiding the whole man - activities which clearly involves touch, which involves matter. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.164) | |
A reaction: This is the inverse of Descartes' interaction problem, and strikes me as a straightforward common sense truth. However, if you believe in spiritual gods, this gives you a model for the interaction (however mysterious) of matter and spirit. |
5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Why are lions ferocious, foxes crafty, and deer timid? It can only be because the mind always shares in the specific growth of the body according to its seed and breed. If it were immortal and reincarnated, living things would have jumbled characters. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.743) | |
A reaction: A nice argument which I have not encountered in modern times. Of course, even Descartes admits that the mind is intermingled with the body, but it seems that the essential character of a mind is dictated by the body. |
5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: One can laugh without being composed of laughing particles, ..so why cannot the things that we see gifted with sensation be compounded of seeds that are wholly senseless? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.988) | |
A reaction: Lovely argument! You might feel driven to panpsychism in your desperation to explain the 'weirdness' of consciousness, but it would be mad to attribute laughter to basic matter, so comedy has to 'emerge' at some point. |
12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
Full Idea: Concepts and other aspects of mental representation have content but not (normally) meaning (unless they are also expressions in a language used in communication). | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1.2) | |
A reaction: Given his account of meaning as involving some complex 'role', he has to say this, though it seems a dubious distinction, going against the grain of a normal request to ask what some concept 'means'. What is 'democracy'? |
12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
Full Idea: (Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics is a version of the theory that meaning is use, where the basic use is taken to be in calculation, not in communication, and where concepts are treated as symbols in a 'language of thought'. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1.1) | |
A reaction: The idea seems to be to connect the highly social Wittgensteinian view of language with the reductive physicalist account of how brains generate concepts. Interesting, thought I never like meaning-as-use. |
12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
Full Idea: A use theory of meaning has to suppose it is words and ways of putting words together that have meaning because of their uses, not sentences. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1.3) | |
A reaction: He says that most sentences are unique, so cannot have a standard use. Words do a particular job over and over again. How do you distinguish the quirky use of a word from its standard use? |
12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
Full Idea: Conceptual role semantics involves meanings of expressions determined by used contents of concepts and thoughts, contents constructed from concepts, concepts determined by functional role, which involves relations to things in the world. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1) | |
A reaction: This essay is the locus classicus for conceptual-role semantics. Any attempt to say what something IS by giving an account of its function always feels wrong to me. |
12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
Full Idea: I call my conceptual role semantics 'non-solipsistic' to contrast it with that of authors (Field, Fodor, Loar) who think of conceptual role solipsistically as a completely internal matter. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1) | |
A reaction: Evidently Harman is influenced by Putnam's Twin Earth, and that meanings ain't in the head, so that the conceptual role has to be extended out into the world to get a good account. I prefer extending into the language community, rather into reality. |
12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
Full Idea: In (nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics the content of thought is not in an 'intrinsic nature', but is rather a matter of how mental states are related to each other, to things in the external world, and to things in a context understood as normal. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.3.3) | |
A reaction: This is part of Harman's functional view of consciousness, which I find rather dubious. If things only have identity because of some place in a flow diagram, we must ask why that thing has that place in that diagram. |
12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
Full Idea: A relation of negation might hold between two beliefs without there being anything that determines which belief is the negative one. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1.4) | |
A reaction: [He attributes this thought to Brian Loar] This seems to give us a reason why we need a semantics for a logic, and not just a structure of inferences and proofs. |
12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
Full Idea: If one cannot think in a language, one has not yet mastered it. A symbol system used only for communication, like Morse code, is not a language. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1.2) | |
A reaction: This invites the question of someone who has mastered thinking, but has no idea how to communicate. No doubt we might construct a machine with something like that ability. I think it might support Harman's claim. |
6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: What is food to one may be literally poison to others. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.638) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the origin of the well-known saying. This is not relativism of perception, but a relativism of how individuals actually respond to the world. It sums up the position with, say, the operas of Wagner. |
5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing in our bodies was born in order that we might be able to use it, but the thing born creates the use. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.834) | |
A reaction: This remark (strongly opposed to Aristotle's view of human function and nature) raises the obvious question of why the body is so very useful for staying alive. Most of its uses are not random. Lucretius would abandon this view if he read Darwin. |
5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: One who no longer is cannot suffer, or differ in any way from one who has never been born. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.867) | |
A reaction: There is a special kind of pain in being poor if you were once rich, which is not suffered by those who experience only poverty. Lucretius is right, but we are concerned with how we feel now, not with how we won't feel once dead. |
5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nature only clamours for two things, a body free from pain, a mind released from worry and fear for the enjoyment of pleasurable sensation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.21) | |
A reaction: I can't help agreeing with those (like Aristotle) who consider this a very demeaning view of human life. See Idea 99. Bentham agrees with Lucretius (Idea 3777). I think they are largely right, but not entirely. Other motives are possible than sensations. |
5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nature is free and uncontrolled by proud masters and runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1094) | |
A reaction: A nice remark. This apparent personification of nature implies the application of laws to an essentially passive reality. See Idea 5442 and Nature|Laws of Nature|Essentialism for a different view. |
5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: There can be no centre in infinity. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.1069) | |
A reaction: This is highly significant, because if we can establish that the universe is infinite (as Epicurus believes), it follows that the human race cannot be at the centre of it, as the Ptolemaic/medieval view proposed. |
5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The universe is not bounded in any direction. If it were, it would necessarily have a limit somewhere, but a thing cannot have a limit unless there is something outside to limit it. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.959) | |
A reaction: This is a subtler argument than the mere enquiry about why you would have to stop at the end of the universe. It still seems a nice argument, though Einstein's curvature of space seems to have thwarted it. |
5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The ultimate realities of heaven and the gods are the atoms, from which nature creates all things and increases and feeds them, and into which, when they perish, nature again resolves them. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.46) | |
A reaction: Sounds right to me. Nothing in modern particle theory and string theory has refuted this claim. But what makes the atoms move, and what makes them combine in an orderly way? Is the orderliness of atoms made of atoms? Essences? |
5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If there are no atoms, the smallest bodies will have infinite parts, since they can be endlessly halved. ..But then there will be no difference between the smallest thing and the whole universe, as they will equally have infinite parts. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.620) | |
A reaction: Another argument which remains effective even now. There must surely (intuitively) be more divisions possible in a large object than in a small one? Unless of course there were many different sizes of infinity…. See Cantor. |
5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: When atoms are travelling straight down through empty space by their own weight, at quite indeterminate times and places they swerve ever so little from their course. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.217) | |
A reaction: Never a popular theory because it seems to breach the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Ideas 306 + 3646). This seems to be the beginning of a strong need for the concept of free will, and an underlying explanation. Most thinkers put mind outside nature. |
17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing has power to break the binding laws of eternity. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], 5.56) | |
A reaction: This seems to be virtually the only remark from the ancient world suggesting that there are 'laws' of nature, so I'm guessing it is a transient metaphor, not a theory about nature. 'Even the gods must bow to necessity'. |
5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Atoms move themselves. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.133) | |
A reaction: Something has to move itself, I suppose, but then that could be psuché, giving us free will (see Idea 1424). Why does Epicurus need the 'swerve' if atoms are self-movers? See Idea 5708. |
5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: We see movement everywhere, but if there were no empty space, things would be denied the power of movement - or rather, they could not possibly have come into existence, embedded as they would have been in motionless matter. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.342) | |
A reaction: This still seems a good argument, if reality is made of particles. People can move in a crowd until it becomes too dense. |
5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Anything can be more speedily disintegrated than put together again. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.558) | |
A reaction: Clearly the concept of entropy was around long before anyone tried to give a systematic or mathematical account of it. |
5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It must not be claimed that anyone can sense time by itself apart from the movement of things or their restful immobility. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.465) | |
A reaction: This seems a remarkably Einsteinian remark, though he is only talking of the epistemology of the matter, not the ontology. We are not far from the concept of space-time here. |
5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It is in the highest degree unlikely that this earth and sky is the only one to have been created. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1057) | |
A reaction: I can only admire the science fiction imagination of this, which roughly agrees with the assessment of modern cosmologists. We think imagination was cramped in the ancient world, and now wanders free - but that is not so. |
5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: In studying the workings of nature, our starting-point will be this principle: nothing can ever be created by divine power out of nothing. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.152) | |
A reaction: This claim seems to cry out for a bit of empiricist caution. What observation has convinced Lucretius that creation out of nothing is impossible? The early Christians switched to the view that divine creation is 'ex nihilo' - out of nothing. |
5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If the matter in things had not been everlasting, everything by now would have gone back to nothing, and the things we see would be the product of rebirth out of nothing. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.544) | |
A reaction: See Idea 1431, which is Aquinas's Third Way of proving God. Aquinas thinks there must be a necessary being outside of the system, but Lucretius thinks there must be some necessary existence within the system (as Hume had suggested). |
5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The universe was certainly not created for us by divine power: it is so full of imperfections. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.180) | |
A reaction: This is certainly a problem if God is 'supremely perfect', as Descartes proposed, because then the universe would also have to be supremely perfect. See Idea 2114 for a possible answer from Leibniz. Hume agrees with Epicurus about design. |
12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Miracles should not be increased beyond necessity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: Leibniz defends miracles (where Spinoza dismisses them). This remark is, of course, an echo of Ockham's Razor, that 'entities' should not be multiplied beyond necessity. It is hard to disagree with his proposal. Zero might be result, though. |
5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The nature of deity is to enjoy immortal existence in utter tranquillity, aloof and detached from our affairs. It is free from all pain and peril, strong in its own resources, exempt from any need of us, indifferent to our merits and immune from anger. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.652) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the seed of late seventeenth century deism - the idea of a Creator who is now absent, and ignores our prayers. At that time 'Epicurean' became a synonym for atheist, but Epicureans never quite reached that point. |
5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Why does Jupiter never hurl his thunderbolt upon the earth and let loose his thunder out of a sky that is wholly blue? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], VI.400) | |
A reaction: Nice question! It really doesn't take very much to see through superstition, and the fact that most people believed such things shows how staggeringly uncritical they were in their thinking, until philosophers appeared and taught them how to reason. |
5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If spirit is immortal and can remain sentient when divorced from our body, we must credit it with possession of five senses; but eyes or nostrils or hand or tongue or ears cannot be attached to a disembodied spirit. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.624) | |
A reaction: This is a powerful argument against immortality. If you are going to see, you must interact with photons; to hear you must respond to compression waves; to smell you must react to certain molecules. Immortality without those would be a bit dull. |
5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It is crazy to couple a mortal object with an eternal and suppose that they can work in harmony and mutually interact. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.799) | |
A reaction: An interesting thought, though not a terrible persuasive argument. A god would indeed be a bit restless if it were chained to a human being, but it would presumably knuckle down to the task if firmly instructed to do it by Zeus. |
5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Spirit is mortal. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.542) | |
A reaction: This is asserted at an historical moment when immortality is beginning to grip everyone's imagination. |
5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Since the substance of the mind is extraordinarily mobile, it must consist of particles exceptionally small and smooth and round, ..so that, when the spirit has escaped from the body, the outside of the limbs appears intact and there is no loss of weight. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.201) | |
A reaction: Lucretius is wonderfully attentive to interesting evidence. He goes on to compare it to the evaporation of perfume. The fine-grained connections of the brain are not far off what he is proposing. |
5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If the spirit is by nature immortal and is slipped into the body at birth, why do we retain no memory of an earlier existence, no impress of antecedent events? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.670) | |
A reaction: Plato took the view that we do recall previous existence, as seen in our innate ideas. This problem forced the Christian church into the uncomfortable claim that God creates the soul at conception, but that it then goes on to immortality. |