6 ideas
22366 | There is no objectivity in social sciences - only viewpoints for selecting and organising data [Weber] |
Full Idea: There is no absolutely objective scientific analysis of 'social phenomena' independent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously they are selected and organised for expository purposes. | |
From: Max Weber ('Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy [1904], p.72), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 5.1 | |
A reaction: Weber urged some objectivity by not judging agents' goals. Also see Idea 22367 |
22367 | The results of social research can be true, and not just subjectively valid for one person [Weber] |
Full Idea: Cultural sciences do not have results which are 'subjective' and only valid for one person and not others. ...For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth. | |
From: Max Weber ('Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy [1904], p.84), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 5.1 | |
A reaction: Weber said that although research interests are subjective, the social causes discovered can be objective. |
14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Insofar as identity seems vague, it is provably mistaken. If it is vague whether x and y are identical (as in the Ship of Theseus), then x,y is definitely not the same as x,x, since the first pair is indeterminate and the second pair isn't. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], App I) | |
A reaction: [compressed; Gareth Evans 1978 made a similar point] This strikes me as begging the question in the Ship case, since we are shoehorning the new ship into either the slot for x or the slot for y, but that was what we couldn’t decide. No rough identity? |
18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Kripke and Putnam made unsubstantiated claims, indeed false claims, to the effect that the theory of direct reference has nontrivial essentialist import. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], Pref to Exp Ed) | |
A reaction: Kripke made very few claims, and is probably innocent of the charge. Most people agree with Salmon that you can't derive metaphysics from a theory of reference. |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
Full Idea: Basing ethics on human flourishing tends towards utilitarianism or consequentialism; actions, character traits, laws, and so on are to be assessed with reference to their contributions to human flourishing. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.2) | |
A reaction: This raises the question of whether only virtue can contribute to flourishing, or whether a bit of vice might be helpful. This problem presumably pushed the Stoics to say that virtue itself is the good, rather than the resulting flourishing. |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
Full Idea: If we base our ethics on human flourishing, one implication would seem to be moral relativism, since what counts as 'flourishing' seems inevitably relative to one or other set of values. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.1) | |
A reaction: This remark seems to make the relativist assumption that all value systems are equal. For Aristotle, flourishing is no more relative than health is. No one can assert that illness has an intrinsically high value in human life. |