24 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
Full Idea: I do not know any better way of showing what there is than looking at the assumptions needed to make sense of our normal talk. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4) | |
A reaction: Davidson was a pupil of Quine. This I take to be the last flowering of twentieth century linguistic philosophy. The ontology we deduce from talk in a children's playground might be very bizarre, but we are unlikely to endorse it. 'Honest, it's true!' |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events, is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our most common talk. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4) | |
A reaction: He considers events to be unanalysable basics. Explanation of normal talk also needs ghosts, premonitions, telepathy and Father Christmas. It is extremely hard to individuate events, unless they are subatomic, and rather numerous. |
1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
Full Idea: Identity supposes an uninterrupted continuance of existence….Otherwise we must suppose a being to exist after it has ceased to exist, and to have existed before it was produced, which are manifest contradictions. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: I take the point to be that if something is supposed to survive a gap in its existence, that must imply that it somehow exists during the gap. If a light flashes on and off, is it really a new entity each time? |
21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
Full Idea: All bodies, as they consist of innumerable parts, are subject to continual changes of their substance. When such changes are gradual, because language could not afford a different name for each state, it retains the same name and is considered the same. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: This is hard to deny. We could hardly rename a child each morning. Simlarly, we can't have a unique name for each leaf on a tree. Economy of language explains a huge amount in philosophy. |
21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
Full Idea: Every man of common sense has a clear and distinct notion of identity. If you ask for a definition of identity, I confess I can give none. It is too simple a notion. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: 'Identical' seems to be a two-place predicate, but the only strict way two things can be identical is if there is actually just one thing. In which case just drop the word 'identity' (instead of defining it), and say there is just one thing here. |
1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
Full Idea: Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6) | |
A reaction: This doesn't mean that Reid thinks there is nothing more to the identity than their similitude. But he, like Hume, denies that there is personal identity at any given instant. Reid is better at criticism than at formulating his own theory. |
23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to show how we could acquire a notion of duration if we had no memory. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: We would probably not have a notion of duration if we possessed a memory, but nothing ever changed. Maybe in Shoemaker's frozen worlds they retain memories, but nothing happens? |
23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
Full Idea: Every man feels he must believe what he distinctly remembers, though he can give no other reason for his belief, but that he remembers the thing distinctly; whereas, when he merely distinctly imagines a thing, he has no belief in it upon that account. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: The word 'distinct' is doing some heavy work here. I fear that believing the memory is the only criterion we have for calling it distinct. As a boy I was persuaded to change my testimony about a car accident, and I realised I was not distinct about it. |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Explanations typically relate statements, not events. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4) | |
A reaction: An oddly linguistic way of putting our attempts to understand the world. Presumably the statements are supposed to be about the events (or whatever), and they are supposed to be true, so we are trying to relate features of the world. |
1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
Full Idea: The identity of a person is a perfect identity: wherever it is real, it admits of no degrees; and it is impossible that a person should be in part the same, and in part different; because a person is a 'monad', and is not divisible into parts. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: I don't accept this, because I don't accept the metaphysics needed to underpin it. To watch a person with Alzheimer's disease fade out of existence before they die seems sufficient counter-evidence. I believe in personal identity, but it isn't 'perfect'. |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects. | |
From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459 | |
A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale? |
1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
Full Idea: Identity, when applied to persons, has no ambiguity, and admits of no degrees. It is the foundation of all rights and obligations, and of all accountableness. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be one of the key mistakes in all of philosophy - thinking that items must always be all-or-nothing. If a person deteriorates through Alzheimer's, there seem to be obvious degrees of personhood. Responsibility comes in degrees, too. |
21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
Full Idea: The conviction of personal identity is indispensably necessary to all exercise of reason. Reasoning is made up of successive parts. Without the conviction that the antecedent have been seen by me, I could have no reason to proceed to the consequent. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: Society needs philosophers precisely to point such things out. It isn't conclusive, but populist waffle about the self not existing undermines the very concept of a 'train of thought', which everybody is signed up to. Trains of thought can take years. |
21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
Full Idea: A man challenges a thief in possession of his horse only on similarity. The testimony of witnesses to the identity of a person is commonly grounded on no other evidence. ...Evidence of our own identity is grounded in memory, and gives undoubted certainty. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: With other people the best we can hope for is type-identity, hoping that each individual being is a unique type, but with otherselves we are always confident of establishing token identity. Could I have been someone different yesterday, without realising? |
21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
Full Idea: Although memory gives the most irresistible evidence of my being the identical person that did such a thing, I may have other good evidence of things which befell me. I know who bare me and suckled me, but I do not remember those events. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: A splendidly accurate and simple observation. Reid's criticisms of Locke are greatly superior to those of Butler. We now have vast collections of photographs showing our past identities. |
21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
Full Idea: Suppose a brave officer, flogged as a boy for robbing an orchard, to have captured a standard in his first campaign, and become a general in advanced life. [If the general forgets the flogging] he is and at the same time is not the same as the boy. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6) | |
A reaction: The point is that strict identity has to be transitive, and if the general forgets his boyhood that breaks the transitivity. If identity is less strict there is no problem. The general may only have memories related to some part of his boyhood. |
21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
Full Idea: If the same consciousness can be transferred from one intelligent being to another, then two or twenty beings may be the same person. If he may lose the consciousness of actions done by him, one intelligent being may be two or twenty different persons. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6) | |
A reaction: Reid says Locke was aware of these two implications of his theory of personal identity (based on consciousness). The first example is me replicated like software. The second is if I forget that I turned the light off, then who did turn the light off? |
21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
Full Idea: When a stolen horse is claimed, the only evidence that this is the same horse is similitude. But would it not be ridiculous from this to infer that the identity of a horse consists in similitude only? | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6) | |
A reaction: Actually that is exactly Hume's view of the matter (Idea 21292). For a strict empiricist there is nothing else be close resemblance over time. I prefer Reid's account to Hume's. - but then I am not a 'strict' empiricist. |
1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
Full Idea: Is it not strange that the identity of a person should consist in a thing (consciousness) which is continually changing? | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6) | |
A reaction: This is the panicky slippery slope view of Locke, that sees his doctrine as the first step to the destruction of religion. The fact is, though, that parts of my consciousness changes continually, but other parts stay the same for years on end. |
1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
Full Idea: My thoughts, and actions, and feelings, change every moment: they have no continued, but a successive, existence: but that self, or I, to which they belong, is permanent. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4) | |
A reaction: The word 'permanent' may be excessive, but one could hardly say there is nothing more to personal identity than the contents of consciousnes, given how much and how quickly those continually fluctuate. |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Davidson distinguishes between causation, an extensional relation that holds between coarse events, and explanation, which is an intensional relation that holds between the coarse events under a description. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2 | |
A reaction: I'm unclear why everything has to be so coarse, when reality and causal events seem to fine-grained, but the distinction strikes me as good. Explanations relate to human understanding and human interests. Cf. Anscombe's view. |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is best to avoid Davidson's view that only quite concrete events can serve as causes; we should either say that facts as well as events can serve as causes; or that the events can be highly unspecific, including 'omissions'. | |
From: comment on Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Hartry Field - Causation in a Physical World 1 | |
A reaction: Something NOT happening might be the main cause of an effect (drought), or an effect may mainly result from a situation rather than an event (famine). |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite). | |
From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3) | |
A reaction: If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer? |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: For Davidson, what makes singular causal statements true is the existence of some regularities or laws. All causal is nomological: c causes e iff there is a law that connects events like c with events like e. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6 | |
A reaction: I wonder if the cart is before the horse here. Scriven says this is just a claim that there are "phantom laws". It is the Humean view of causation, but surely the laws come after the causation, so can't be used to explain it? |