Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'works' and 'Introduction to Philosophical Papers I'

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I should have like to be a piecemeal, unsystematic philosopher, offering independent proposals on a variety of topics. It was not be. I succumbed too often to the temptation to presuppose my views on one topic when writing on another.
     From: David Lewis (Introduction to Philosophical Papers I [1983], p.1)
     A reaction: He particularly mentions his possible worlds realism as a doctrine which coloured all his other work. A charming insight into the mind of a systematic thinker (called by someone 'the most systematic metaphysician since Leibniz').
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]
     Full Idea: It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
     From: William K. Clifford (works [1870]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
     A reaction: This is a famous remark, but is in danger of being tautological unless one gives some account of what 'insufficient' means. If Clifford means the evidence must be conclusive, this is nonsense. 'Never believe if there is no evidence' is better.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
     Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects.
     From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459
     A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale?