4 ideas
9103 | A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: I maintain that a universal is not something real that exists in a subject [of inherence], either inside or outside the mind, but that it has being only as a thought-object in the mind. | |
From: William of Ockham (Ordinatio [1320], DII Qviii prima redactio) | |
A reaction: [A footnote says that William later abandoned this view] I don't see a clear distinction here between having real existence in the mind, and being a thought-object in the mind. Maybe we should say 'merely' a thought-object? |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects. | |
From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459 | |
A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale? |
9104 | A universal is the result of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: A universal is not the result of generation, but of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing. | |
From: William of Ockham (Ordinatio [1320], DII Qviii prima redactio) | |
A reaction: The phrase 'mental picturing' works very plausibly for the universal 'giraffe', but not so well for 'multiplication' or 'contradiction'. Though we might broaden 'picturing' to being a much less visual concept. Mapping seems basic. |
19407 | We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The true practical philosophy consists in good rules for education, intercourse and sociability among men, rather than in general precepts on virtues and duties. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Bouvet [1697], p.165) | |
A reaction: I would interpret that as saying that the main aim of morality is to enable people to hold a good conversation. I've heard worse theories of morality. The remark shows why Leibniz has little to say explicitly about morality. |