19 ideas
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Whereas there might be just one fact that a true proposition was like, we would have to say that a false proposition was unlike any fact. We could not speak of the fact that it was false of, so we could not speak of its being false of anything at all. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: Ryle brings out very nicely the point Russell emphasised so much, that the most illuminating studies in philosophy are of how falsehood works, rather than of how truths work. If I say 'the Queen is really a man' it is obvious what that is false of. |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
Full Idea: One map of Sussex is like another, but it is not true of that other map, but only of the county. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: One might question whether a map is in any sense 'true' of Sussex, though one must admit that there are good and bad maps of Sussex. The point is a nice one, which shows that there is no simple account of truth as correspondence. |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Logic studies the way in which one thing follows from another, in which one thing is compatible with another, contradicts, corroborates or necessitates another, is a special case of another or the nerve of another. And so on. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: I presume that 'and so on' would include how one thing proves another. This is quite a nice list, which makes me think a little more widely about the nature of logic (rather than just about inference). Incompatibility isn't a process. |
13174 | A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I don't say that bodies like flint, which are commonly called inanimate, have perceptions and appetition; rather they have something of that sort in them, like worms are in cheese. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17) | |
A reaction: Leibniz is caricatured as thinking that stones are full of little active minds, but he nearly always says that what he is proposing is 'like' or 'analogous to' that. His only real point is that nature is active, as seen in the appetites of animals. |
13175 | Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Just as we somehow conceive other souls and intelligences on analogy with our own souls, I wanted whatever other primitive entelechies there may be remote from our senses to be conceived on analogy with souls. They are not conceived perfectly. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17) | |
A reaction: This is the clearest evidence I can find that Leibniz does not think of monads as actually being souls. He is struggling to explain their active character. Garber thinks that Leibniz hasn't arrived at proper monads at this date. |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
Full Idea: There are many sentences which do not state facts, while there are no facts which (in principle) could not be stated. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Substitute') | |
A reaction: Hm. This seems like a nice challenge. The first problem would be infinite facts. Then complex universal facts, beyond the cognizance of any mind. Then facts that change faster than thinking can change. Do you give up yet? Then there's.... |
9212 | Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2) | |
A reaction: The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that. |
13172 | What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It does not follow that what we can't imagine does not exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18) | |
A reaction: This just establishes the common sense end of the debate - that you cannot just use your imagination as the final authority on what exists, or what is possible. |
9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2) | |
A reaction: His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds. |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
Full Idea: The theory of Representative Ideas begs the whole question, by assuming a) that we can know these 'Ideas', b) that we can know the realities they represent, and c) we can know a particular 'idea' to be representative of a particular reality. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: Personally I regard the ideas as immediate (rather than acquired by some knowledge process), and I am dimly hoping that they represent reality (or I'm in deep trouble), and I am struggling to piece together the reality they represent. I'm happy with that. |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Those who find 'judgments' everywhere and propositions nowhere find that some judgments cohere whereas others are incoherent. What is the status of the terms between which these relations hold? | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this strikes me as a nice point. I presume Russell after 1906 is the sort of thinker he has in mind. |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
Full Idea: It is argued by Husserl and (virtually) by Meinong that only if there are such entities as objective Meanings - and propositions are just a species of Meaning - is there anything for Logic to be about. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: It is presumably this proposal which led to the scepticism about meanings in Wittgenstein, Quine and Kripke. The modern view, which strikes me as right, is that logic is about inference, and so doesn't need a subject-matter. |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
Full Idea: If I have uttered my sentence aloud, a listener can both understand what I say or grasp my meaning, and also infer to my state of mind. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], I) | |
A reaction: This simple observations seems rather important. If we shake written words onto the floor, they might add up to a proper sentence, but half of the point of a sentence is missing. Irony trades on the gap between meaning and state of mind. |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
Full Idea: As the orthodox terms 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are equivocal, since they may equally well denote 'thinkings' as 'what-is-thought', the 'accusatives' of acts of thinking have come to be called 'propositions'. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], I) | |
A reaction: I have understood propositions to be capable of truth or falsity. 'What is thought' could be a right old jumble of images and disjointed fragments. Propositions are famous for their unity! |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
Full Idea: We ordinarily find no difficulty in saying of a given thing that several people believe it and so, if they think it false, 'make the same mistake' or 'labour under the same delusion'. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this (like 13980) strikes me as quite good support for propositions. I suppose you can describe these phenomena as assent to sentences, but they might be very different sentences to express the same delusion. |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Although we speak of thinking in French, we never talk of knowing or believing or opining in French. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Substitute') | |
A reaction: Once again Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but he does it rather well, and offers good support for my belief in propositions. I love this. 'I know, in French, a bank where the wild thyme blows'. |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
Full Idea: There are no substantial propositions...There is just a relation between grammatical structure and the logical structure of facts. 'Proposition' denotes the same as 'sentence' or 'statement'. A proposition is not what I think, but what I think or talk in. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Conclusions') | |
A reaction: The conclusion of Ryle's discussion, but I found his support for propositions much more convincing than his critique of them, or his attempt at an alternative linguistic account. He never mentioned animals, so he self-evidently hasn't grasped the problem. |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
Full Idea: All the arguments for the subsistence of true propositions seem to hold good for the subsistence of false ones. We might even have to find room for absurd or nonsensical ones like 'some round squares are not red-headed'. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: A particularly nice example of a Category Mistake from the man who made them famous. Why can't we just make belief a proposition attitude, so I equally believe 'sea is blue', 'grass is pink' and 'trees are bifocal', but the status of my belief varies? |
13173 | Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Death is nothing but the contraction of an animal, just as generation is nothing but its unfolding. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18) | |
A reaction: This is possibly the most bizarre view that I have found in Leibniz. He seemed to thing that if you burnt an animal on a bonfire, some little atom of life would remain among the ashes. I can't see why he would believe such a thing. |