57 ideas
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish between entailment and validity as logical relations on the one hand, and inferring as a voluntary human activity on the other. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
Full Idea: Theoretical reason is typically a matter of accepting a conclusion or hypothesis on the basis of argument or evidence, and is thus a special case of practical reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
Full Idea: Constraints of rationality are built into the structure of mind and language, specifically into the structure of intentionality and speech acts. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Int xiv) |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
Full Idea: The constraints of rationality ought to be thought of adverbially; they are a matter of the way in which we coordinate our intentionality. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
15957 | Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle] |
Full Idea: Essential definitions are such as are taken from the essential differences of things, which constitute them in such a sort of natural bodies, and discriminate them from all those of any other sort. | |
From: Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666], p.41?), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles | |
A reaction: I don't think this goes as far as the aim Aristotle had in definitions, which was more than merely to 'discriminate' each thing. A full definition explains the thing as well. |
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Whereas there might be just one fact that a true proposition was like, we would have to say that a false proposition was unlike any fact. We could not speak of the fact that it was false of, so we could not speak of its being false of anything at all. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: Ryle brings out very nicely the point Russell emphasised so much, that the most illuminating studies in philosophy are of how falsehood works, rather than of how truths work. If I say 'the Queen is really a man' it is obvious what that is false of. |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
Full Idea: One map of Sussex is like another, but it is not true of that other map, but only of the county. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: One might question whether a map is in any sense 'true' of Sussex, though one must admit that there are good and bad maps of Sussex. The point is a nice one, which shows that there is no simple account of truth as correspondence. |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
Full Idea: If you think you need a rule to infer q from 'p and (if p then q)', then you would also need a rule to infer p from p. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Logic studies the way in which one thing follows from another, in which one thing is compatible with another, contradicts, corroborates or necessitates another, is a special case of another or the nerve of another. And so on. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: I presume that 'and so on' would include how one thing proves another. This is quite a nice list, which makes me think a little more widely about the nature of logic (rather than just about inference). Incompatibility isn't a process. |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
Full Idea: In real-life reasoning it is the semantic content that guarantees the validity of the inference, not the syntactical rule. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
Full Idea: I am no fan of the concept of supervenience. Its uncritical use is a sign of philosophical confusion, because the concept oscillates between causal supervenience and constitutive supervenience. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.9 n5) | |
A reaction: I don't see why you shouldn't assert the supervenience of one thing on another, while saying that you are not sure whether it is causal or constitutive. The confusion seems to me to be in understandings of the causal version. |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
Full Idea: There are many sentences which do not state facts, while there are no facts which (in principle) could not be stated. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Substitute') | |
A reaction: Hm. This seems like a nice challenge. The first problem would be infinite facts. Then complex universal facts, beyond the cognizance of any mind. Then facts that change faster than thinking can change. Do you give up yet? Then there's.... |
15965 | Boyle attacked a contemporary belief that powers were occult things [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: Boyle attacks an idea of powers, held by some modern schoolmen and chemists, that makes powers occult. | |
From: report of Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666]) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 03.3 | |
A reaction: [This involves Boyle's famous example of a key having the power to turn a lock] On p.86 Alexander says the 'occult' belief is in affinities, antipathies, attractions and repulsions. How did Boyle explain magnetism? |
16735 | In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In Locke and Boyle, 'disposition' and its various cognates are standardly used to refer to the corpuscular structure of a body - the spatial arrangement of its parts - without reflecting any commitment to a dispositional property. | |
From: report of Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.2 | |
A reaction: Here as a warning against enthusiasts for dispositional properties misreadigmg 17th century texts to their supposed advantage. Pasnau says none of them believe in dispositional properties or real powers. |
16034 | Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle] |
Full Idea: I understand the word 'form' to mean, not a real substance distinct from matter, but only the matter itself of a natural body, with its peculiar manner of existence [corpuscular structure], which may be called its 'essential modification' or 'stamp'. | |
From: Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666], p.324), quoted by Jan-Erik Jones - Real Essence §3 | |
A reaction: I don't think Aristotle ever thought that a form was separate from its matter, let alone qualifying as a substance. On the whole, Boyle attacks scholastic philosophy, rather than Aristotle. |
15953 | To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle] |
Full Idea: If it be demanded why rhubarb purges choler, snow dazzles the eyes rather than grass etc., that these effects are performed by substantial forms of the respective bodies is at best but to tell me what is the agent, not how the effect is wrought. | |
From: Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666], p.47?), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 01.2 | |
A reaction: This is the problem of the 'virtus dormitiva' of opium (which at least tells you it was the opium what done it). I take Aristotle to have aspired to a lot more than this. He wanted a full definition, which would contain lots of information about the form. |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
Full Idea: A belief is a commitment to truth. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.III) |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
Full Idea: If I lie and say "It is raining", my utterance is intelligible to me as a lie precisely because I understand that the utterance commits me to the truth of a proposition I do not believe to be true. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6.II) |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
Full Idea: The terminology of "propositional attitudes" is confused, because it suggests that a belief is an attitude towards a propositions, …but the proposition is the content, not the object, of my belief. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.2) |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
Full Idea: We should not say "It thinks" in preference to "I think". If thinking is an active, voluntary process, there must be a self who thinks. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) |
15964 | Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind' [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: There is no suggestion in Boyle that secondary qualities are, unlike primary qualities, somehow illusory, subjective or 'in the mind'. | |
From: report of Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666]) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 03.3 | |
A reaction: [Alexander goes on to say that his also applied to Locke] |
15962 | Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: Perhaps Boyle's most important technical terms is 'texture'. ...It must not be confused with the way we feel the texture of a surface like sandpaper or velvet; it is rather a structure of unobservable particles and so it is not directly observable. | |
From: report of Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666]) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 03.2 | |
A reaction: This is the basis for Alexander's reassessment of what Boyle and Locke meant by a 'secondary quality', which, he says, is a physical feature of objects, not a mental experience. |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
Full Idea: The theory of Representative Ideas begs the whole question, by assuming a) that we can know these 'Ideas', b) that we can know the realities they represent, and c) we can know a particular 'idea' to be representative of a particular reality. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: Personally I regard the ideas as immediate (rather than acquired by some knowledge process), and I am dimly hoping that they represent reality (or I'm in deep trouble), and I am struggling to piece together the reality they represent. I'm happy with that. |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
Full Idea: Both reasons and the things they are reasons for can be either facts in the world or intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I) | |
A reaction: One might point out that beliefs, desires and intentions are facts in the world too. Implicit dualism. One can ask, what turns a fact into a reason? |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
Full Idea: For a long time people had a reason not to smoke cigarettes, without knowing that they had such a reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: What does 'had' a reason mean here? If I wish you dead, there is a reason why you should be dead, but you don't 'have' the reason, and never will have. There's probably a reason why I should never have been born. |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
Full Idea: Causes are typically events, reasons are never events. You can give a reason by stating a cause, but it does not follow that the reason and the cause are the same thing. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I) | |
A reaction: This is against Davidson. I'm with Searle here; my having a reason to do something is not the cause of my doing it. I don't, unlike Searle, believe in free will, but doing something for a reason is not just the operation of the reason. |
15960 | Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle] |
Full Idea: Explicating a phenomenon is to deduce it from something else in nature more known to us than the thing to be explained by it. | |
From: Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666], p.46?), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles | |
A reaction: Interesting that the word 'deduce' is here, beloved of the 'covering law' view. But this may be deduced from the behaviour of other substances, as the iron filing behaviour may be explained by the magnet itself (or perhaps 'laws' of magnetism). |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
Full Idea: I am held responsible now for things that I did in the distant past. But that only makes sense if there is some entity that is both the agent of the action in the past and me now. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
A reaction: A possible response, of course, is that you are held responsible for your past deeds, but you shouldn't be. The idea that you are the same as when you committed the crime is a convenient fiction for people who desire revenge. Responsibility fades. |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
Full Idea: The requirement that I state reasons that I acted on requires a reference to the self. …Only for a self can something be a reason for an action. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
A reaction: Why can't we just say that this reason, given this desire and this belief, led to this action, and never mention the self? Admittedly leaving out 'I' is an odd circumlocution, but I don't find this particular argument very convincing. |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
Full Idea: In order to be a self the entity that acts as an agent must also be capable of conscious reasoning about its actions. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VIII) | |
A reaction: I can't accept this all-or-nothing account. A chimpanzee is some sort of 'agent', and there are bad chimpanzees you wouldn't want in your colony. Why does Searle want to cut us off in some special compound where our actions are totally different? |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
Full Idea: Selfhood in my sense comes for free once you have a conscious intentional being capable of engaging in free actions on the basis of reasons. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.II) | |
A reaction: The concept of an 'action' is probably the thing that most clearly needs a self, because it implies co-ordination and purpose, and there must be some item which benefits. Personally I think you can drop 'free actions' and still have a self. |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
Full Idea: It is a formal requirement on rational action that there must be a self who acts, in a way that it is not a formal requirement on perception that there be an agent or a self who perceives. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
A reaction: I don't find this persuasive. I don't see how we can rule out a priori the possibility of a set of desires and reasons within an organism which generate an action, without any intervening 'self' to add something. Ockham's Razor. |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
Full Idea: A self is conscious, persists through time, operates with reasons, carries out free actions, and is responsible. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.X) | |
A reaction: Personally I would substitute 'makes decisions' for 'carries out free actions', but otherwise I agree, though he seems to miss a key aspect, which is that the self is in charge of the mind, and directs its focus and co-ordinates its inputs and outputs. |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
Full Idea: The first condition on the self is that it should be capable of consciousness. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a stipulative definition. It raises the question of whether it is possible that a lizard (say) is not actually conscious, but has some sort of propriotreptic awareness, and a 'central controller' for its decision-making. |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
Full Idea: The self is not an experience, nor is it an object that is experienced. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
A reaction: A nice dichotomy, that draws attention to the unique position of the self. Thanks to Descartes for focusing our attention on it. Personally I would say that the self is an object, which cannot be experienced by itself, but can be inferred by others. |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
Full Idea: Agency must be added to the bundle to account for how embodied bundles engage in free actions, and selfhood must be added to account for how agents can act rationally. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
A reaction: I don't buy much of this, but I am inclined to say that a will must be added to the bundle to explain why it acts consistently and coherently. It is certainly ridiculous to rest with the picture of a person as a completely unstructured bundle. |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
Full Idea: The most dramatic manifestation of the free will gap is that when one has several reasons for performing an action, one may act on only one of them; one may select which reason one acts on. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.II) |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
Full Idea: In order to engage in rational decision making we have to presuppose free will. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
Full Idea: Where free rational action is concerned, all effective reasons are made effective by the agent. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.II) |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Those who find 'judgments' everywhere and propositions nowhere find that some judgments cohere whereas others are incoherent. What is the status of the terms between which these relations hold? | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this strikes me as a nice point. I presume Russell after 1906 is the sort of thinker he has in mind. |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
Full Idea: It is argued by Husserl and (virtually) by Meinong that only if there are such entities as objective Meanings - and propositions are just a species of Meaning - is there anything for Logic to be about. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: It is presumably this proposal which led to the scepticism about meanings in Wittgenstein, Quine and Kripke. The modern view, which strikes me as right, is that logic is about inference, and so doesn't need a subject-matter. |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
Full Idea: If I have uttered my sentence aloud, a listener can both understand what I say or grasp my meaning, and also infer to my state of mind. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], I) | |
A reaction: This simple observations seems rather important. If we shake written words onto the floor, they might add up to a proper sentence, but half of the point of a sentence is missing. Irony trades on the gap between meaning and state of mind. |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
Full Idea: As the orthodox terms 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are equivocal, since they may equally well denote 'thinkings' as 'what-is-thought', the 'accusatives' of acts of thinking have come to be called 'propositions'. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], I) | |
A reaction: I have understood propositions to be capable of truth or falsity. 'What is thought' could be a right old jumble of images and disjointed fragments. Propositions are famous for their unity! |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
Full Idea: We ordinarily find no difficulty in saying of a given thing that several people believe it and so, if they think it false, 'make the same mistake' or 'labour under the same delusion'. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this (like 13980) strikes me as quite good support for propositions. I suppose you can describe these phenomena as assent to sentences, but they might be very different sentences to express the same delusion. |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Although we speak of thinking in French, we never talk of knowing or believing or opining in French. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Substitute') | |
A reaction: Once again Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but he does it rather well, and offers good support for my belief in propositions. I love this. 'I know, in French, a bank where the wild thyme blows'. |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
Full Idea: There are no substantial propositions...There is just a relation between grammatical structure and the logical structure of facts. 'Proposition' denotes the same as 'sentence' or 'statement'. A proposition is not what I think, but what I think or talk in. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Conclusions') | |
A reaction: The conclusion of Ryle's discussion, but I found his support for propositions much more convincing than his critique of them, or his attempt at an alternative linguistic account. He never mentioned animals, so he self-evidently hasn't grasped the problem. |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
Full Idea: All the arguments for the subsistence of true propositions seem to hold good for the subsistence of false ones. We might even have to find room for absurd or nonsensical ones like 'some round squares are not red-headed'. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: A particularly nice example of a Category Mistake from the man who made them famous. Why can't we just make belief a proposition attitude, so I equally believe 'sea is blue', 'grass is pink' and 'trees are bifocal', but the status of my belief varies? |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
Full Idea: A well-ordered set of preferences is typically the result of successful deliberation, and is not its precondition. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
Full Idea: If I desire to get rid of my flu symptoms, and believe the only way to do it is death, I am committed to desiring my death. …there is no plausible logic of practical reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.8.II) |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
Full Idea: The single greatest difference between humans and other animals as far as rationality is concerned is our ability to create, recognise and act on desire-independent reasons for action. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
Full Idea: Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6 App) |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
Full Idea: To say that something is true is already to say that you ought to believe it. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.II) | |
A reaction: I'm sure what Einstein said is true, but I don't understand it. The truth is the thought of how things actually are, but why should I not prefer my private fantasies? I see the point, though. |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
Full Idea: From the fact that an object is truly described as "a man", it follows that you ought to accept relevantly similar objects as men. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.IV) | |
A reaction: 'Similar' rather begs the question. Common speech distinguishes sharply between a man and a 'real man'. You only accept them as men if you see them as men, not as similar to something else. Interesting. |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
Full Idea: The obligation to keep a promise does not derive from the institution of promising, ..but from the fact that in promising I freely and voluntarily create a reason for myself. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6.IV) |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
Full Idea: To say that someone 'ought' to do something is to imply that there is a reason for him to do it. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
15952 | The corpuscles just have shape, size and motion, which explains things without 'sympathies' or 'forces' [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: In Boyle's corpuscular philosophy, all material substances are composed of minute particles or corpuscles, with ordinary properties such as shape, size and motion. There was no need for occult relations between them, such as sympathies, or even forces. | |
From: report of Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666]) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 01.1 |
15972 | The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: Though there is motion, the corpuscles will not be dynamic because the idea of forces between the particles or groups of them does not figure in the theory. | |
From: report of Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666]) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the view of Locke, as well as of Boyle. I quote this because I take to it be a particular target of Leibniz's disagreement. |