4 ideas
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics. | |
| From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2 | |
| A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases. |
| 16721 | Changes in secondary qualities are caused by changes in primary qualities [Giles of Orleans] |
| Full Idea: Every alteration in secondary qualities is caused by some alteration made in the primary qualities. | |
| From: Giles of Orleans (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1270], I.6c) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau calls this the 'supervenience' thesis, here with the addition of causation. Was this doctrine retained by Locke and Boyle? |
| 6853 | Consequentialism wrongly assumes a clear line between an act and its consequences [Crisp,R] |
| Full Idea: What is wrong with consequentialism is that it assumes that there is agreement about when an act ends and when its consequences begin. | |
| From: Roger Crisp (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.31) | |
| A reaction: I certainly agree that this is a mistake in consequentialism, which has a crude idea of what an action is, though I am not convinced that this is the key fault in the theory. The theory doesn't distinguish acts by people from those by machines. |
| 6854 | Does the environment have value in itself? [Crisp,R] |
| Full Idea: The debate which dominates environmental ethics is whether the environment has value in itself. | |
| From: Roger Crisp (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.37) | |
| A reaction: I say the answer has to be 'yes'. If it only has value in relation to conscious or human life, it will be difficult to demonstrate that they have value. Pleasure and pain, or wisdom, can't imply value on their own; a bigger picture is needed. |