21908
|
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
|
|
Full Idea:
Ontology can be an ontology of difference ....where what is there is not the same old things but a process of continual creation, an ontology that does not seek to reduce being to the knowable, but widens thought to palpate the unknowable.
|
|
From:
Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968]), quoted by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 5.05
|
|
A reaction:
I'm inclined to think that the first duty of ontology is to face up to the knowable. I'm not sure that probing the unknowable, with no success or prospect of it, is a good way to spend a life. Probing ('palpating') can sometimes discover things.
|
21904
|
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
|
|
Full Idea:
In Deleuze, Being is not a puzzle to be solved but a problem to be engaged. It is to be engaged by a thought that moves as comfortably among problems as it does among solutions, as fluidly among differences as it does among identities.
|
|
From:
report of Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 4.01
|
|
A reaction:
This sounds like what I've always known as 'negative capability' (thanks to Keats). Is philosophy just a hobby, like playing darts? It seems that the aim of the process is 'liberation', about which I would like to know more.
|
6901
|
Understanding is needed for imagination, just as much as the other way around [Betteridge]
|
|
Full Idea:
Although it might be right to say that imagination is required in order to make reasoning and understanding possible, this also works the other way, as imagination cannot occur without some prior understanding.
|
|
From:
Alex Betteridge (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
|
|
A reaction:
This strikes me as a very illuminating remark, particularly for anyone who aspires to draw a simplified flowdiagram of the mind showing logical priority between its various parts. In fact, the parts are interdependent. Maybe imagination is understanding.
|
21929
|
Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida]
|
|
Full Idea:
Derrida affirms something like an 'ambiguity of meaning'. But he explicitly contrasts the word he uses to characterize the phenomenon at issue, what he calls 'dissemination', with the traditional concept of 'polysemia' - multiple meanings.
|
|
From:
Jacques Derrida (Of Grammatology [1967]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 2 'After'
|
|
A reaction:
The point, I presume, is that there is vagueness and elision to the meanings, rather than a list of options, such as bank/bank. Context (sense-making paths) is crucial for Derrida. Can the analytic apparatus for the logic of vagueness be brought to bear?
|