Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Evidentialism' and 'Propositions'

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15 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: What is it that is susceptible of truth or falsity? The answers suggested constitute a bewildering variety: sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgments, propositions, statements.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 01)
     A reaction: Carwright's answer is 'statements', which seem to be the same as propositions.
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: The current fashion among logicians of taking sentences to be the bearers of truth and falsity indicates less an agreement on philosophical theory than a desire for rigor and smoothness in calculative practice.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 01)
     A reaction: A remark close to my heart. Propositions are rejected first because language offers hope of answers, then because they seem metaphysically odd, and finally because you can't pin them down rigorously. But the blighters won't lie down and die.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: We cannot take a token of a word to be an occurrence of it. Suppose there is exactly one occurrence of the word 'etherized' in the whole of English poetry? Exactly one 'token'? This sort of occurrence is like the occurrence of a number in a sequence.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], Add 2)
     A reaction: This remark is in an addendum to his paper, criticising his own lax use of the idea of 'token' in the actual paper. The example nicely shows that the type/token distinction isn't neat and tidy - though I consider it very useful.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag]
     Full Idea: While one might understand the proposition entailed by one's evidence, one might have no idea how or why one's evidence entails it. This seems to imply one is not justified in believing the proposition on the basis of one's evidence.
     From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Evidential')
     A reaction: An example might be seen if a layman tours a physics lab. This looks like a serious problem for evidentialism. Once you see why the evidence entails the proposition, you are getting closer to understanding than to knowledge. Explanation.
Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag]
     Full Idea: If one came to believe p with good evidence, but has since forgotten that evidence, we might think one can continue to believe justifiably, but evidentialism appears unable to account for this.
     From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Forgotten')
     A reaction: We would still think that the evidence was important, and we would need to trust the knower's claim that the forgotten evidence was good. So it doesn't seem to destroy the evidentialist thesis.
Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag]
     Full Idea: Evidentialism is not a theory about when one's believing is justified; it is a theory about what makes one justified in believing a proposition. It is a thesis regarding 'propositional justification', not 'doxastic justification'.
     From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Preliminary')
     A reaction: Thus it is entirely about whether the evidence supports the proposition, and has no interest in who believes it or why. Knowledge is when you believe a true proposition which has good support. This could be internalist or externalist?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]
     Full Idea: Traditional coherence theories seem unable to account for the role experience plays in justification.
     From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Evidence')
     A reaction: I'm inclined to say that experience only becomes a justification when it has taken propositional (though not necessarily lingistic) form. That is, when you see it 'as' something. Uninterpreted shape and colour can justify virtually nothing.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: It does have to be acknowledged, I think, that every statement whatever is such that there is no one meaning which any sentence used to assert it must have.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 11)
     A reaction: This feels to me like a Gricean move - that what we are really interested in is communicating one mental state to another mental state, and there are all sorts of tools that can do that one job.
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: No one ever asserts the meaning of the words he utters.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 12)
     A reaction: Cartwright is using this point to drive a wedge between sentence meaning and the assertion made by the utterance. Hence he defends propositions. Presumably people utilise word-meanings, rather than asserting them. Meanings (not words) are tools.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: We need to distinguish 1) what is asserted, 2) that assertion, 3) asserting something, 4) what is predicated, 5) what is uttered, 6) that utterance, 7) uttering something, 8) the utterance token, and 9) the meaning.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 05-06)
     A reaction: [summary of his overall analysis in the paper] It is amazingly hard to offer a critical assessment of this sort of analysis, but it gives you a foot in the door for thinking about the issues with increasing clarity.
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: A person who utters 'It's raining' one day does not normally make the same statement as one who utters it the next. But these variations are not accompanied by corresponding changes of meaning. The words 'It's raining' retain the same meaning throughout.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 10)
     A reaction: This is important, because it shows that a proposition is not just the mental shadow behind a sentence, or a mental shadow awaiting a sentence. Unlike a sentence, a proposition can (and possibly must) include its own context. Very interesting!
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: We do sometimes say of something to which we have referred that it is true (or false). Are we not ordinarily doing just this when we utter such sentences as 'That's true' and 'What he said was false'?
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 03)
     A reaction: This supports propositions, but doesn't clinch the matter. One could interpret this phenomenon as always being (implicitly) the reference of one sentence to another. However, I remember what he said, but I can't remember how he said it.
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: In order to assert that p it is not necessary to utter exactly those words. ...Clearly, also, in order to assert that p, it is not sufficient to utter the words that were actually uttered.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 07)
     A reaction: I take the first point to be completely obvious (you can assert one thing with various wordings), and the second seems right after a little thought (the words could be vague, ambiguous, inaccurate, contextual)
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: Whereas what is asserted can be said to be accurate, exaggerated, unfounded, overdrawn, probable, improbable, plausible, true, or false, none of these can be said of the meaning of a sentence.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 12)
     A reaction: That fairly firmly kicks into touch the idea that the assertion is the same as the meaning of the sentence.
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Bruno said that ancient Egyptian magic was the true religion [Bruno, by Yates]
     Full Idea: Giordano Bruno maintained that the magical Egyptian religion of the world was not only the most ancient but also the only true religion, which both Judaism and Christianity had obscured and corrupted.
     From: report of Giordano Bruno (works [1590]) by Frances A. Yates - Giordano Bruno and Hermetic Tradition Ch.1
     A reaction: His beliefs were based on the Hermetic writings. No wonder he was burned at the stake. Atheists now lay flowers at his memorial in Rome. The sixteenth century was when the hunt for alternatives to established religion began.