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9766
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Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
My investigation of vagueness began with the question 'What is the correct logic of vagueness?', which led to the further question 'What are the correct truth-conditions for a vague language?', which led to questions of meaning and existence.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], Intro)
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A reaction:
This is the most perfect embodiment of the strategy of analytical philosophy which I have ever read. It is the strategy invented by Frege in the 'Grundlagen'. Is this still the way to go, or has this pathway slowly sunk into the swamp?
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9775
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Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Maybe classical logic fails for vagueness in Excluded Middle. If 'H bald ∨ ¬(H bald)' is true, then one disjunct is true. But if the second is true the first is false, and the sentence is either true or false, contrary to the borderline assumption.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 4)
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A reaction:
Fine goes on to argue against the implication that we need a special logic for vague predicates.
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18933
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Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius]
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Full Idea:
I. Nothing exists. a) Not-Being does not exist. b) Being does not exist as everlasting, as created, as both, as One, or as Many. II. If anything does exist, it is incomprehensible. III. If existence is comprehensible, it is incommunicable.
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From:
report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE], B03) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09
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A reaction:
[Also Sextus Empiricus, Against Logicians I.65-] For Part I he works through all the possible modes of being he can think of, and explains why none of them are possible. It is worth remembering that Gorgias loved rhetoric, not philosophy!
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9768
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Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
I take vagueness to be a semantic feature, a deficiency of meaning. It is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability, and ambiguity.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], Intro)
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A reaction:
Sounds good. If we cut nature at the joints with our language, then nature is going to be too subtle and vast for our finite and gerrymandered language, and so it will break down in tricky situations. But maybe epistemology precedes semantics?
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9776
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A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
There is a possibility of 'higher-order vagueness'. The vague may be vague, or vaguely vague, and so on. If J has few hairs on his head than H, then he may be a borderline case of a borderline case.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 5)
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A reaction:
Such slim grey areas can also be characterised as those where you think he is definitely bald, but I am not so sure.
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9770
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Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
With a three-value approach, if P is 'blob is pink' and R is 'blob is red', then P&P is indefinite, but P&R is false, and P∨P is indefinite, but P∨R is true. This means the connectives & and ∨ are not truth-functional.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 1)
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A reaction:
The point is that there could then be no logic in any way classical for vague sentences and three truth values. A powerful point.
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9773
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With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
With the super-truth approach, if P is 'blob is pink' and R is 'blob is red', then P&R is false, and P∨R is true, since one of P and R is true and one is false in any complete and admissible specification. It encompasses all 'penumbral truths'.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 3)
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A reaction:
[See Idea 9767 for the super-truth approach, and Idea 9770 for a contrasting view] The approach, which seems quite appealing, is that we will in no circumstances give up basic classical logic, but we will make maximum concessions to vagueness.
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9866
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Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato]
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Full Idea:
Gorgias insists that the art of persuasion is superior to all others because it enslaves all the rest, with their own consent, not by force, and is therefore by far the best of all the arts.
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From:
report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Plato - Philebus 58a
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A reaction:
A nice point, and it is not unreasonable to rank the arts in order of their power. To enchant, without achieving agreement, and to speak truth without persuading, are both very fine, but there is something about success that cannot be gainsaid.
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