Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Being (frags)', 'On 'Physics'' and 'Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Successive entities are in flux, flowing in existence, with different parts at different times [Oresme]
     Full Idea: For any time, some of a successive entity exists in one of its parts, and a totally different such exists in another part. …It is in continuous flux and transition, ..and flows in existence if it does not have the same existence over a whole time.
     From: Nicole Oresme (On 'Physics' [1346], III.6, dist.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1
     A reaction: Pasnau says the successive entity is the whole made up of these changing parts, so it sounds very like the temporal stages view of Sider and Hawley.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: It may well be that completed neuroscience will not include a reduction of folk psychology, but why should that be a reason to regard it as false? It would only be a reason if irreducibility entailed that they could not possibly both be true.
     From: comment on Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981]) by Robert Kirk - Mind and Body §3.9
     A reaction: If all our behaviour had been explained by a future neuro-science, this might not falsify folk psychology, but it would totally marginalise it. It is still possible that dewdrops are placed on leaves by fairies, but this is no longer a hot theory.
Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Eliminative materialism says our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena is a radically false theory, so defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced (rather than reduced).
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981], Intro)
     A reaction: It is hard to see what you could replace the idea of a 'belief' with in ordinary conversation. We may reduce beliefs to neuronal phenomena, but we can't drop the vocabulary of the macro-phenomena. The physics of weather doesn't eliminate 'storms'.