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All the ideas for 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)', 'Russell' and 'Molyneux's Question'

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7 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism

6408	Russell needed three extra axioms to reduce maths to logic: infinity, choice and reducibility [Grayling]
	Full Idea: In order to deduce the theorems of mathematics from purely logical axioms, Russell had to add three new axioms to those of standards logic, which were: the axiom of infinity, the axiom of choice, and the axiom of reducibility.
	From: A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2)
	A reaction: The third one was adopted to avoid his 'barber' paradox, but many thinkers do not accept it. The interesting question is why anyone would 'accept' or 'reject' an axiom.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates

12699	A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier

12700	Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
	A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent

12736	If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
	Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
	From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
	A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence

6414	Two propositions might seem self-evident, but contradict one another [Grayling]
	Full Idea: Two propositions might contradict each other despite appearing self-evident when considered separately.
	From: A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2)
	A reaction: Russell's proposal (Idea 5416) is important here, that self-evidence comes in degrees. If self-evidence was all-or-nothing, Grayling's point would be a major problem, but it isn't. Bonjour explores the idea more fully (e.g. Idea 3704)

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

7639	The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]
	Full Idea: The 'homunculus fallacy' attempts to explain what is involved in a subject's being related to objects in the external world by appealing to the existence of an inner situation which recapitulates the essential features of the original situation.
	From: Gareth Evans (Molyneux's Question [1978], p.397)
	A reaction: This is obviously right, but we aren't forced to settle for direct realism. Inner perception may be very different, or we may employ the idea of Dennett and Lycan, that the homunculi don't regress, they deteriorate steadily down into mechanisms.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism

12698	Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism.