Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Exigency to Exist in Essences', 'Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags)' and 'Syntactic Structure'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: The view of Chomsky in 1957 that category mistakes are syntactically well-formed but meaningless is a very standard one.
     From: report of Noam Chomsky (Syntactic Structure [1957]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3
     A reaction: I'm going off the idea that they are meaningless, largely because I am beginning to sympathise with the view that any composition of meaningful components is meaningful (even if blatantly false).
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91)
     A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system?
God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92)
     A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92)
     A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: In 1957 Chomsky argues that syntax is an independent field from semantics. …To support this claim he argues that the now-famous category mistake 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously' is grammatical but meaningless.
     From: report of Noam Chomsky (Syntactic Structure [1957]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3
     A reaction: I'm tempted by the thought that this famous sentence actually is meaningful, although the meaning is fragmentary, and any proposition which can be assembled from it appears to be blatantly false.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius]
     Full Idea: Aenesidemus does not allow either happiness or pleasure or prudence or any other goal held by anyone on the basis of philosophical doctrine as the goal of life; rather, he says that there just is no such thing as a goal which is recognised by all people.
     From: report of Aenesidemus (Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags) [c.60 BCE], Bk 8) by 'Photius Bibliotheca' - Aenesidimus (frags) 170b
     A reaction: This is probably the dominant modern (post-Darwinian, existentialist) view. Personally I am sympathetic to the Aristotelian view that (to some extent) appropriate goals for life can be inferred from a fairly stable human nature.