7 ideas
17914 | He made a molten sea, which was ten cubits across, and thirty cubits round the edge [Anon (Kings)] |
Full Idea: And he made a molten sea, ten cubits from the one brim to the other; it was round all about, and his height was five cubits: and a line of cubits did compass it round about. | |
From: Anon (Kings) (11: Book of Kings 1 [c.550 BCE], 7:23) | |
A reaction: In the sixth century BCE, this appears to give 3 as the value of Pi, though perhaps it shouldn't be taken too literally! |
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91) | |
A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system? |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up. |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers. |
12167 | Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Characteristic of expression is the presence of 'reference' without predication. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Representation in Music [1976], p.71) | |
A reaction: This echoes (in linguistic terms) Kant's thought that art is 'purposive without purpose'. The remark is comfortable in an essay on music, but it gets more tricky when the topic is literature, or even representational painting. |
12166 | If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If a passage carries a reference to love, we are not told what it says about love. And to speak of language with 'reference' but no predication is simply to misuse the word. We leave the realm of representation and enter that of expression. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Representation in Music [1976], p.63-4) | |
A reaction: This is a beautifully simple objection to the idea (associated with Nelson Goodman) that art is a language. Though what an 'expression' of something amounts to I am not quite sure. |
12168 | Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to the understanding of music. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Representation in Music [1976], p.74) | |
A reaction: I would not have thought that many people thought music was representational, but Scruton particularly mentions passages in opera that seem to pick up aspects of the story. Do even bell sounds not represent bells? |