7 ideas
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91) | |
A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system? |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up. |
21710 | We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell] |
Full Idea: We are aware of the universal 'yellow'; this universal is the subject in such judgements as 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911], 154), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 2.3 | |
A reaction: This still seems one of the strongest examples in support of universals. You could hardly be talking about yellow tropes in such instances (even if the world does contain yellow tropes). |
16616 | Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius] |
Full Idea: It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist. | |
From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2 | |
A reaction: This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence. |
16585 | Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius] |
Full Idea: Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms. | |
From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1 | |
A reaction: This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away. |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The actual universe is the collection of the possibles which forms the richest composite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92) | |
A reaction: 'Richest' for Leibniz means a maximum combination of existence, order and variety. It's rather like picking the best starting team from a squad of footballers. |
8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
Full Idea: My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911]) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §4 | |
A reaction: This pinpoints a nice difficulty for Russell. Williams may misrepresent Russell's account of acquaintance, but that is probably because Russell is unclear, or uncertain. The problem is when Russell claims that his acquaintance gives knowledge. |